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SISYPHUS MEETS ICARUS:  
THE JURISDICTIONAL AND COMITY LIMITS 
OF POST-SATISFACTION ANTI-FOREIGN-SUIT 
INJUNCTIONS 
Anthony C. Piccirillo*
 
 
This Note addresses an emerging conflict concerning federal subject 
matter jurisdiction and international comity:  can and should federal courts 
issue post-satisfaction anti-foreign-suit injunctions?  The Eighth Circuit has 
held that a federal court no longer possesses subject matter jurisdiction to 
grant anti-suit injunctions after a party has satisfied judgment.  The Eighth 
Circuit also held that a post-satisfaction anti-foreign-suit injunction would 
be inconsistent with international comity.  In contrast, the Second Circuit 
has held that a federal court possesses continuing subject matter 
jurisdiction to grant anti-foreign-suit injunctions after the satisfaction of 
judgment and that such an injunction does not violate international comity.   
This Note argues that, as a general matter, federal courts no longer 
possess subject matter jurisdiction to grant anti-suit injunctions after the 
satisfaction of judgment.  It also contends that post-satisfaction anti-
foreign-suit injunctions are ordinarily inconsistent with international 
comity and concludes that the President and Congress, not the courts, are 
better equipped to resolve legal disputes implicating United States foreign 
relations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Greek mythology, Sisyphus famously suffered a particularly cruel 
eternal punishment.1  In Hades, Sisyphus was forced to roll a gigantic 
boulder to the top of a steep hill.2  But each time the boulder reached the 
precipice, it would tumble back down the slope.3  Sisyphus would then 
retrieve the boulder and recommence the task with no hope of ever 
completing his maddening labor.4
For federal courts, international commercial litigation may often seem 
like a Sisyphean struggle.
 
5  When a controversy spans two or more 
countries and parties have substantial resources, litigation can drag on for 
years with no end in sight.6  Courts may adjudicate disputes only to see one 
of the parties bring another lawsuit in a foreign forum.  In some cases a 
party may even satisfy judgment and then seek to reverse the judgment in 
another country’s courts.7
 
 1. See, e.g., HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 269, Book XI (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books 
1996). 
 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id.; see also APOLLODORUS, THE LIBRARY OF GREEK MYTHOLOGY 17, Book I 
(Keith Aldrich trans., Coronado Press 1975) (“He suffers this punishment because of 
Asopus’ daughter Aegina.  For when Zeus secretly made off with her, Sisyphus is said to 
have informed Asopus, who was searching for her.”). 
 5. Cf. Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468 F.3d 213, 222 (4th Cir. 2006) (describing 
black lung tort litigation as a “Sisyphean endeavor”); Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 
555 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing complicated litigation over World War II human rights 
violations as “a Sisyphean task:  Just when the court appears to be making progress towards 
reaching legal peace, the rock rolls back down and the court must tackle the next issue”). 
 6. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
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Anti-foreign-suit injunctions provide courts with a means by which to 
escape the Sisyphean torment of endless international litigation.  Such 
injunctions prevent parties from maintaining a parallel lawsuit and provide 
much-needed finality for the judicial system.8  However, a federal court’s 
power to issue anti-foreign-suit injunctions is not limitless.9  The court must 
have subject matter jurisdiction10 and the injunction must be consistent with 
international comity.11
In light of the limits of jurisdiction and comity, federal courts should be 
mindful of another Greek myth—the story of Icarus.
 
12  Daedalus and his 
son Icarus escaped from exile through the use of artificial wings.13  
Although Daedalus cautioned Icarus not to fly too close to the sun, Icarus 
did not heed the warning.14  Overjoyed with his power and newfound 
freedom, Icarus pushed the limits.15  When the sun melted his wings, he 
plummeted to the sea.16
Federal courts must not attempt to escape the plight of Sisyphus by 
succumbing to the error of Icarus.  This is particularly true for post-
satisfaction anti-foreign-suit injunctions, that is, when a court enjoins a 
party from maintaining subsequent foreign litigation even though that party 
has fully satisfied the court’s judgment.  Under such circumstances, federal 
courts ordinarily lack subject matter jurisdiction to issue an anti-foreign-suit 
injunction.
 
17  In addition, comity generally mandates that courts refrain 
from granting anti-foreign-suit injunctions after the satisfaction of 
judgment.18
On June 23, 2008, the Supreme Court of the United States denied 
certiorari on a pair of cases that addressed post-satisfaction anti-foreign-suit 
injunctions.  These cases, Goss International Corp. v. Man Roland 
Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft
 
19 and Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan 
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara20 differed on whether a 
federal court can and should issue an anti-foreign-suit injunction against a 
party after it has satisfied judgment.21
 
 8. See infra Part I.B. 
 
 9. This Note does not address whether state courts can and should grant post-
satisfaction anti-foreign-suit injunctions. However, much of its analysis, particularly with 
regard to international comity, may be applicable to state courts. 
 10. See infra Part I.C. 
 11. See infra Part I.D. 
 12. See APOLLODORUS, supra note 4, at 90. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See id.; see also OVID, METAMORPHOSES 272, Book VIII (Charles Martin trans., 
W.W. Norton & Co. 2004) (“[T]he boy audaciously began to play and driven by desire for 
the sky, deserts his leader and seeks altitude.  The sun’s consuming rays, much nearer now, 
soften the fragrant wax that bound his wings until it melts.”). 
 17. See infra Parts I.C, III.A. 
 18. See infra Parts I.D, III.B. 
 19. 491 F.3d 355 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 554 U.S. 917 (2008). 
 20. 500 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 554 U.S. 929 (2008). 
 21. See infra Part II. 
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The issue of post-satisfaction anti-foreign-suit injunctions complicates a 
longstanding circuit split regarding the proper role of comity in anti-
foreign-suit injunctions.22  It also reveals an emerging conflict regarding the 
extent to which a federal court’s ancillary jurisdiction extends after the 
satisfaction of judgment.23  While some commentators have mentioned the 
comity implications of Goss and Karaha Bodas, the ancillary jurisdiction 
issue is relatively uncharted territory.24
In Goss, a U.S. manufacturer of printing presses (Goss) sued a Japanese 
manufacturer (TKS) in the Northern District of Iowa under the 
Antidumping Act of 1916.
 
25  A jury awarded Goss over $35 million in 
damages.26  While TKS appealed, Japan enacted a clawback statute 
allowing Japanese parties to recover damages paid out under the 
Antidumping Act.27  When TKS attempted to sue Goss under the Japanese 
law, the U.S. Court issued an anti-suit injunction.28  After losing on appeal, 
TKS satisfied judgment and asked that the injunction be removed.29  When 
the district court refused to lift the anti-suit injunction, TKS appealed.30  
The Eighth Circuit held that the district court lacked ancillary jurisdiction to 
issue an anti-foreign-suit injunction since judgment was satisfied and, even 
if there was continuing subject matter jurisdiction, an injunction would have 
violated international comity.31
The Second Circuit reached a different conclusion in Karaha Bodas.  In 
that case, a Cayman Islands company owned and controlled mostly by U.S. 
investors (KBC) agreed to a joint venture with an Indonesian state-owned 
oil and gas company (Pertamina).
 
32
 
 22. See infra Part I.D. 
  When Pertamina suspended the 
project, KBC brought an action before an arbitration tribunal in Switzerland 
 23. See infra Part I.C. 
 24. See Charles Kotuby, Comity at the Court:  Three Recent Orders Seeking the View of 
the Solicitor General, CONFLICT OF LAWS (Feb. 21, 2008), http://conflictoflaws.net/2008/
comity-at-the-court-three-recent-orders-seeking-the-view-of-the-solicitor-general/ (focusing 
on the comity aspects of the Goss–Karaha Bodas split but also mentioning that the conflict 
“stems around the doctrine of ‘ancillary jurisdiction,’ specifically whether a federal court 
loses the power to bar foreign litigation once it decides the merits of a claim and the 
resulting judgment is satisfied”); Bradley P. Nelson, Presentation Before the American Bar 
Association, Conflicts in the Law of Foreign Antisuit Injunctions, Section on Litigation (July 
30–Aug. 2, 2009), available at http://www.sw.com/5AA59A/AAttachments/Article_re_
Antisuit_Injunctions.pdf (highlighting the comity aspects of the Goss–Karaha Bodas split 
but not discussing ancillary jurisdiction in depth). 
 25. Pub. L. No. 64-271, §§ 800-01, 39 Stat. 756, 798, repealed by Pub. L. No. 108-429, 
§ 2006, 118 Stat. 2434, 2597 (2004); see also Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland 
Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491 F.3d 355, 356 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 26. See Goss, 491 F.3d at 356−57. 
 27. “A clawback statute is a countermeasure that enables defendants who have paid a 
multiple damage judgment in a foreign country to recover the multiple portion of that 
judgment from the plaintiff.” Id. at 357 n.2. 
 28. See id. at 359. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. at 356−57. 
 31. See id. at 368. 
 32. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 500 
F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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and won a $261 million award.33  After years of litigation in forums 
throughout the world,34  KBC ultimately brought an action to enforce the 
arbitral award in the Southern District of New York.35  The New York 
federal court issued a judgment in favor of KBC, which Pertamina 
satisfied.36  Pertamina then brought suit against KBC in the Cayman Islands 
claiming that the arbitral award was based on fraud.37  The district court 
enjoined Pertamina from proceeding with the Cayman Islands action and 
Pertamina appealed.38  The Second Circuit held that the principles of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel gave the court ancillary jurisdiction to 
maintain an anti-foreign-suit injunction, even after the satisfaction of 
judgment.39  The court also held that the anti-suit injunction did not violate 
international comity.40
The conflict on post-satisfaction anti-foreign-suit injunctions is important 
for three reasons.  First, it adds greater complexity to international 
commercial disputes, which could affect litigants’ strategies in international 
litigation.
 
41  Second, this conflict reveals doctrinal uncertainty on 
fundamental questions of federal subject matter jurisdiction and the extent 
to which it extends after judgment is satisfied.42  Finally, the conflict over 
post-satisfaction anti-foreign-suit injunctions implicates international 
comity and, consequently, relations between the United States and other 
countries.43
This Note consists of three parts.  Part I provides background on multi-
forum international litigation and anti-suit injunctions.  It next examines 
federal ancillary subject matter jurisdiction and discusses Supreme Court 
cases supporting what this Note calls the restrictive and permissive rules on 
post-satisfaction ancillary jurisdiction.  Finally, Part I addresses the role of 
comity in anti-foreign-suit injunctions through an examination of a current 
circuit split on the question. 
 
Part II describes and analyzes the respective holdings of Goss and 
Karaha Bodas.  This part discusses how these two decisions took opposite 
positions on ancillary jurisdiction and diverged on comity.  Finally, this part 
examines the practical consequences of the respective court decisions. 
In Part III, this Note proposes a resolution to the conflict on post-
satisfaction anti-foreign-suit injunctions.  This part contends that the Eighth 
Circuit properly adopted the restrictive rule on post-satisfaction ancillary 
jurisdiction while the Second Circuit incorrectly adopted the permissive 
rule.  With regard to comity, Part III contends that, as a general matter, 
 
 33. See id. at 113−14. 
 34. See id. at 114−16. 
 35. See id. at 116. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. at 117. 
 38. See id. at 117−18. 
 39. See id. at 127−30. 
 40. See id. at 120−27. 
 41. See infra Part I.A. 
 42. See infra Part I.C. 
 43. See infra Part I.D. 
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courts should refrain from issuing anti-foreign-suit injunctions after the 
satisfaction of judgment.  Nonetheless, there may be exceptional 
circumstances, such as in Karaha Bodas, where post-satisfaction anti-
foreign-suit injunctions are consistent with comity.  Finally, Part III 
recommends that courts defer to the executive and legislative branches on 
matters that implicate international relations and the sovereignty of foreign 
states. 
I.  POST-SATISFACTION ANTI-FOREIGN-SUIT INJUNCTIONS:  
DOCTRINAL AND POLICY FOUNDATIONS 
This part provides background for understanding the conflict on post-
satisfaction anti-foreign-suit injunctions.  Part I.A discusses the challenges 
of managing multi-forum international litigation.  Part I.B discusses the 
procedural and practical aspects of anti-suit injunctions as a method for 
resolving multi-forum litigation.  The rest of this part examines the limits 
on federal courts’ power to grant anti-foreign-suit injunctions, separately 
addressing the constraints of subject matter jurisdiction and international 
comity. 
A.  Rolling Sisyphus’s Boulder:  Managing Multi-forum 
 International Litigation 
There are a variety of mechanisms, besides anti-foreign-suit injunctions, 
which enable courts to cope with parallel proceedings in foreign forums.  
This section first briefly highlights the reasons why litigants may choose to 
pursue parallel litigation.  Next, it addresses the concepts of forum non 
conveniens, lis alibi pendens, and the preclusion doctrines of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel.  Finally, it mentions the possibility of avoiding 
parallel proceedings through the use of forum selection clauses.44
1.  Motivations for Multi-forum International Litigation 
 
A party may choose to commence a duplicative action in a foreign forum 
for a variety of strategic reasons.  First, a defendant to an action in an initial 
forum may seek a declaration of no liability in a foreign forum that it can 
then enforce in the original forum through res judicata or collateral 
estoppel.45  This tactic may be particularly advantageous to the defendant if 
the parallel forum would apply more favorable substantive law.46
 
 44. See infra Part I.A.5. 
  Second, 
a defendant may bring a parallel foreign action in order to place pressure on 
the plaintiff by forcing him to litigate simultaneously in two different 
 45. See Kenneth B. Reisenfeld, “The Usual Suspects”:  Six Common Defense Strategies 
in Cross-Border Litigation, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION STRATEGIES AND PRACTICE 75, 84 
(Barton Legum ed., 2005).  For a more detailed discussion of res judicata, see infra Part 
I.A.4. 
 46. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 
926−27, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that defendants brought a parallel action in the U.K. 
because U.S. law is more favorable for antitrust plaintiffs). 
1414 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
countries.47  Finally, a party may bring a foreign action to obtain procedural 
advantages that might not be available in the initial forum.48  This last 
rationale is particularly relevant given the perceived plaintiff-friendly 
characteristics of U.S. courts.49
2.  Forum Non Conveniens 
   
Courts are not powerless against the strategic machinations of globe-
trotting litigants.  One of a court’s most significant powers is its ability to 
dismiss a suit under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.50  Forum non 
conveniens is a common law doctrine that permits a court to decline 
jurisdiction over a case if another forum would be more convenient or 
appropriate.51  Although no statute or rule specifically authorizes forum non 
conveniens, courts have “repeatedly recognized the existence of the power 
to decline jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances” even when personal 
jurisdiction and venue are proper.52  While Congress has passed legislation 
authorizing the transfer of cases among federal courts,53 forum non 
conveniens remains relevant in federal courts when a foreign court is more 
appropriate or convenient.54
The Supreme Court has held that while a court should ordinarily favor 
the plaintiff’s choice of forum, it may weigh public and private interests to 
determine whether it should dismiss a case on forum non conveniens 
grounds.
 
55
 
 47. See Reisenfeld, supra note 
  In many cases, these public and private interests clearly point to 
45, at 84. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See José I. Astigarraga & Scott A. Burr, Antisuit Injunctions, Anti-antisuit 
Injunctions, and Other Worldly Wonders, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION STRATEGIES AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 45, at 89−90.  Features of U.S. Courts that may appeal to plaintiffs, 
and pose a challenge to defendants, are: 
(1) the availability of contingent-fee lawyers . . . ; (2) the availability of punitive or 
treble damage awards; (3) the availability of jury trials in civil cases; (4) the 
availability of broader discovery; (5) the absence of rules making an unsuccessful 
party liable for the costs of the successful party; (6) the availability of causes of 
action that might not exist in other countries, such as under the . . . RICO statute, 
the antitrust laws, or the securities laws; and (7) the availability of class action 
suits. 
Id. 
 50. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS 347 (4th ed. 2007). 
 51. See id. 
 52. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947). 
 53. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in 
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or 
division where it might have been brought.”). 
 54. See, e.g., BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 50, at 353. 
 55. The Court has articulated the factors to be weighed: 
The factors pertaining to the private interests of the litigants includ[e] the “relative 
ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for 
attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; 
possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all 
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and 
inexpensive.”  The public factors bearing on the question include[ ] the 
administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the “local interest in 
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dismissal in favor of a foreign court, especially when evidence and 
witnesses are located abroad and the foreign law would apply.56  Under 
such circumstances, a court may dismiss an action even if the dismissal 
would result in less favorable substantive law for the plaintiff.57  
Nonetheless, forum non conveniens may not be appropriate if a foreign 
forum would provide the plaintiff with “no remedy at all.”58
When a parallel proceeding is already underway or is contemplated in a 
foreign forum, courts are generally more willing to grant a forum non 
convieniens dismissal.
 
59  However, courts will often attach certain 
conditions to the dismissal to assure that the plaintiff will actually be able to 
litigate in the foreign forum.60  For example, a court may require the 
defendant to waive a statute of limitations defense, consent to jurisdiction 
and service in the foreign forum, make witnesses available, provide 
discovery consistent with the scope of U.S. law, or promise to pay a 
judgment in the foreign forum.61
In sum, forum non conveniens allows courts to dispose of certain cases at 
an early stage and encourages parties to continue the litigation in a more 
appropriate forum.  In such cases the court often invites the parties to 
continue or commence a parallel action abroad.
 
62  However, when a court 
wishes to defer to a foreign proceeding, but is unwilling or unable to 
dismiss the case under forum non conveniens, it may instead invoke the 
principle of lis alibi pendens.63
3.  Lis Pendens 
 
The doctrine of lis alibi pendens, or simply lis pendens, permits a court to 
stay an action in deference to litigation in another forum, rather than 
dismissing the case outright through forum non conveniens.64
 
having localized controversies decided at home”; the interest in having the trial of 
a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern the action; 
the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of 
foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with 
jury duty. 
  Although 
there is no statutory or constitutional provision authorizing lis pendens, 
courts have consistently stayed proceedings in favor of other forums, 
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508−09).  
 56. See id. at 258−60. 
 57. See id. at 247 (“The possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not 
be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry.”). 
 58. Id. at 254. 
 59. See Reisenfeld, supra note 45, at 82. 
 60. See id. at 83. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 50, at 522 (“Although the forum non conveniens 
doctrine often applies in the absence of any related foreign litigation, U.S. courts have 
occasionally applied the doctrine in cases involving parallel foreign litigation.”). 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
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including foreign forums.65  Lis pendens motions are most promising when 
parties seek a stay in favor of a case that was filed earlier or 
simultaneously.66  Only rarely do courts grant lis pendens motions in favor 
of subsequently filed foreign lawsuits.67
4.  Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel 
 
While forum non conveniens and lis pendens allow courts to defer to 
foreign proceedings, courts do not ordinarily interfere with simultaneous 
foreign litigation.68  As the D.C. Circuit has noted, “parallel proceedings on 
the same in personam claim should ordinarily be allowed to proceed 
simultaneously, at least until a judgment is reached in one which can be 
pled as res judicata in the other.”69  Once a court reaches a judgment, the 
other court is expected to cease litigation on any claims or issues decided in 
the first forum.70
Res judicata and the similar doctrine of collateral estoppel are necessary 
elements of any functional judicial system because they protect the finality 
of judgments.
 
71  Res judicata bars litigants from raising a claim that was or 
should have been asserted in a prior proceeding.72  Collateral estoppel 
prevents parties from contesting issues that were actually litigated in a 
previous proceeding and were necessary to a prior judgment.73  U.S. courts 
will ordinarily apply res judicata and collateral estoppel to foreign 
judgments, and vice versa.74 As discussed below, U.S. courts may feel 
compelled to issue anti-suit injunctions when it is unclear whether a foreign 
court would respect the U.S. court’s decision.75
 
 65. See, e.g., Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(staying a U.S. action in favor of a pending appeal in German courts).  There is uncertainty 
regarding the appropriate standard for lis pendens. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 50, at 
524−26.  Some federal courts have followed Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), which emphasized “the virtually unflagging obligation 
of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them” and thus limiting the use of lis 
pendens. Id. at 817.  Meanwhile, other federal courts have looked to Landis v. North Am. 
Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936), which suggests a more liberal standard for lis pendens. See BORN 
& RUTLEDGE, supra note 50, at 524−26. 
 
 66. See Astigarraga & Burr, supra note 49, at 95−96. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 
926−27 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 69. Id.; see also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 50, at 522. 
 70. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 50, at 522. 
 71. See LINDA J. SILBERMAN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE:  THEORY AND PRACTICE 775 (3d 
ed. 2009).  Res judicata is also called “claim preclusion” and collateral estoppel is also called 
“issue preclusion.” See id.  In addition, “res judicata” may be used as a blanket term for both 
preclusion doctrines. See id.  In keeping with the language used by most of the cited cases, 
this Note uses the term res judicata to refer to the preclusion of claims and collateral estoppel 
to refer to the preclusion of issues. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. at 776. 
 74. See 18 LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 130.50 (3d ed. 1997). 
 75. See infra Part I.D. 
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5.  Planning Ahead:  Forum Selection and Arbitration Agreements 
It is important to note that parties can often avoid multiple proceedings in 
different countries by adopting agreements and arbitration agreements.  A 
forum selection agreement is a contract requiring parties to litigate their 
disputes in a particular forum.76  While U.S. courts once disfavored forum 
selection clauses,77 the Supreme Court has since held that “in the light of 
present-day commercial realities and expanding international trade,” a 
forum selection clause “should control absent a strong showing that it 
should be set aside.”78  Ordinarily, a U.S. court may only reject a forum 
selection agreement on the grounds of “(1) defects in the formation or 
validity of the forum selection agreement and other contractual defenses, 
such as fraud, duress, unconscionability, and lack of assent; (2) 
unreasonableness; and (3) public policy.”79
Parties can also agree to avoid courts altogether by submitting their 
disputes to arbitration.  Many businesses prefer arbitration to litigation 
because of arbitration’s perceived advantages in time, flexibility, and 
expense.
 
80  Consequently, businesses engaged in international commerce 
may decide to include arbitration clauses in their contracts.81  Most 
countries, including the United States, defer to these agreements and thus 
they provide an effective means of avoiding multi-forum litigation.82
One caveat:  while it is a good practice for parties to adopt forum 
selection or arbitration clauses, it is important to note that such clauses have 
no value in disputes not based on a pre-existing contractual relationship 
between parties.
 
83
B.  Sisyphus Revolts:  Anti-suit Injunctions in Federal Courts 
 
In addition to the tools discussed above, federal courts may also manage 
multi-forum international litigation through the use of anti-foreign-suit 
injunctions.  This section first addresses the doctrinal basis for federal 
courts’ power to grant such injunctions.  It then discusses anti-foreign-suit 
 
 76. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 50, at 435. 
 77. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9−10 (1972). 
 78. Id. at 15. 
 79. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 50, at 460.  The proposed Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements also adopts a favorable approach to forum selection 
agreements, recognizing them as presumptively valid. See 44 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1294, 
1296−97 (2005). 
 80. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 929 (2d Cir. 1983); Leonard V. 
Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1049 (1961). 
 81. See Joseph T. McLaughlin & Kathleen M. Scanlon, Updated:  A Master Checklist 
for Drafting Contract Clauses in Transnational Matters, ALTERNATIVES, June 2009, at 105 
(discussing strategies for drafting effective arbitration clauses). 
 82. See infra Part I.B.2.a. 
 83. See Louise Ellen Teitz, Where to Sue:  Finding the Most Effective Forum in the 
World, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION:  STRATEGIES AND PRACTICE, supra note 45, at 51.  For 
example, there was a forum selection clause in the joint-venture contract in Karaha Bodas, 
see infra note 259, while in Goss such a clause would not have been possible since there was 
no contract between the parties, see infra Part II.A.1. 
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injunctions from a practical perspective and highlights situations where 
post-satisfaction anti-foreign-suit injunctions may arise. 
1.  Statutory Authority 
It is undisputed that federal courts have the power to enjoin parties under 
their jurisdiction from maintaining lawsuits in another forum.84  The All 
Writs Act85 is the source of this power, stating that “[t]he Supreme Court 
and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary 
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the 
usages and principles of law.”86
The Anti-Injunction Act
 
87 prohibits anti-suit injunctions against lawsuits 
in state court unless “expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where 
necessary in aid of [a federal court’s] jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate 
[a federal court’s] judgments.”88  Since the act’s initial adoption in 1793, 
courts have given meaning to its terms.  For example, in Chick Kam Choo 
v. Exxon Corp.,89 the Supreme Court held that there is a “relitigation 
exception” to the Anti-Injunction Act, which “is founded in the well-
recognized concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel” and permits “a 
federal court to prevent state litigation of an issue that previously was 
presented to and decided by the federal court.”90  The Anti-Injunction Act 
does not apply to federal courts’ ability to enjoin proceedings in foreign 
courts.91
2.  Anti-foreign-suit Injunctions in Practice 
 
While an anti-foreign-suit injunction could arise in a number of 
situations, this section will focus on two scenarios in which post-
satisfaction anti-suit injunctions are possible:  international arbitration and 
clawback statutes. 
 
 84. See, e.g., Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491 
F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 2007); China Trade and Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 
33, 35 (2d Cir. 1987) (“The power of federal courts to enjoin foreign suits by persons subject 
to their jurisdiction is well-established.”); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World 
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“It is well settled that . . . American courts 
have power to control the conduct of persons subject to their jurisdiction to the extent of 
forbidding them from suing in foreign jurisdictions.”). 
 85. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006).  
 86. See Goss, 491 F.3d at 364 (noting that the All Writs Act gives federal courts the 
power to issue anti-suit injunctions); BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 50, at 549−50. 
 87. 28 U.S.C. § 2283. 
 88. Id. 
 89. 486 U.S. 140, 146−47 (1988) (noting that the Anti-Injunction Act has “existed in 
some form since 1793” and citing cases where the Supreme Court has defined the Act’s 
scope). 
 90. See id. at 147. 
 91. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 50, at 541. 
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a.  Anti-foreign-suit Injunctions in International Arbitration 
As arbitration remains an important method of international commercial 
dispute resolution, anti-foreign-suit injunctions are often an unwelcome 
disruption.92  In international arbitration, anti-foreign-suit injunctions are 
most likely to arise in two contexts:  (1) a court may enjoin parties from 
pursuing arbitration in a foreign forum,93 or (2) a court that is enforcing an 
arbitral award may enjoin a party from bringing a suit in a foreign forum 
designed to nullify the award.94
In general, U.S. courts are less likely to enjoin foreign arbitral 
proceedings than the courts of some nations.
 
95  However, a U.S. court may 
issue anti-foreign-suit injunctions against arbitration proceedings if, for 
example, it finds that the dispute is not arbitrable or is not covered by the 
arbitration agreement.96
The second context arises when a party seeks to enforce an arbitral 
award.  The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards of 1958
 
97 (the New York Convention), 
which has nearly 150 signatories,98 governs the enforcement of 
international arbitral awards.99
 
 92. Emmanuel Gaillard, Introduction to ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 1 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 2005) (noting that the use of anti-suit injunctions 
has spread from common law jurisdictions to civil law jurisdictions and that the use of anti-
suit injunctions in international arbitration “has been spreading at a disturbing pace”).  It 
should be noted, however, that anti-foreign-suit injunctions arise in only a small portion of 
all international arbitrations.  For example, during a three-year period, only fifteen out of an 
estimated 1,500 arbitrations before the International Chamber of Commerce involved anti-
suit injunctions. See Julian D.M. Lew, Anti-suit Injunctions Issued by National Courts to 
Prevent Arbitration Proceedings, in ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION, supra, at 33. 
  The New York Convention requires 
 93. See Axel H. Baum, Anti-suit Injunctions Issued by National Courts to Permit 
Arbitration Proceedings, in ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra 
note 92, at 19. 
 94. See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 
500 F.3d 111, 112 (2d Cir. 2007).  For a legal analysis of the ability of arbitral panels to 
issue their own anti-suit injunctions, see generally Laurent Lévy, Anti-suit Injunction Issued 
by Arbitrators, in ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 92, at 
115−29. 
 95. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1−16 (2006) (requiring U.S. courts to 
enforce arbitration agreements in most circumstances); see also Lew, supra note 92, at 39 
(“Unfortunately, there are corners of the world [where courts regularly use anti-foreign-suit 
injunctions to thwart international arbitration] where there is a belief that the State must 
protect its interests at all costs.”). 
 96. See Lew, supra note 92, at 32. 
 97. Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York 
Convention].  The implementing legislation for the New York Convention is codified at 9 
U.S.C. §§ 201−208 (2006). 
 98. Status 1958—Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_
texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
 99. See New York Convention, supra note 97, at art. 1 (“This Convention shall apply to 
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than 
the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out 
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contracting states to enforce arbitral awards originating in other contracting 
states with very limited exceptions.100  While U.S. courts regularly confirm 
foreign arbitral awards, in some circumstances, parties might seek to nullify 
the award by bringing suit in another forum.101  In such instances, it may be 
appropriate for a U.S. court to issue an anti-foreign-suit injunction.102
b.  Anti-foreign-suit Injunctions and Clawback Statutes 
 
As a consequence of the perception that certain U.S. laws are too 
plaintiff-friendly,103 some foreign legislatures have adopted blocking 
statutes designed to protect their citizens from the extraterritorial 
application of certain U.S. laws and procedures, particularly U.S. trade 
laws.104  These blocking statutes generally seek to prevent or limit the 
availability of discovery or prohibit the enforcement of certain U.S. 
judgments within the country’s jurisdiction.105  The most radical type of 
blocking statute is a clawback statute, which gives defendants who lost in 
U.S. court a cause of action to recover some or all of the judgment against 
them in a foreign court.106
Foreign countries may adopt clawback statutes in response to specific 
U.S. policies.
 
107  In 1980, the United Kingdom passed the Protection of 
Trading Interests Act, which allowed defendants in certain U.S. antitrust 
cases to sue the victorious plaintiff in U.K. courts and collect the multiple 
portion of damages.108
 
of differences between persons, whether physical or legal.  It shall also apply to arbitral 
awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and 
enforcement are sought.”). 
  Canada, Australia, France, and members of the 
 100. See id. at art. 5 (enumerating the grounds for declining to enforce an arbitral award). 
 101. See, e.g., Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi 
Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 359−60, 375−76 (5th Cir. 2003) (considering and ultimately reversing 
an anti-foreign-suit injunction directed at an Indonesian lawsuit challenging the 
determination of a Swiss arbitral tribunal). 
 102. Compare id. (reversing the district court’s decision to grant an anti-foreign-suit 
injunction), with Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi 
Negara, 500 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s decision to grant an anti-
foreign-suit injunction). 
 103. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 104. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795, 799 (1993) (holding that 
U.S. antitrust laws apply to foreign conduct that has a substantial effect on the U.S. and 
declining to consider whether jurisdiction should be declined because of comity 
considerations); see also R. Edward Price, Foreign Blocking Statutes and the GATT:  State 
Sovereignty and the Enforcement of U.S. Economic Laws Abroad, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. 
& ECON. 315, 316 (1995) (arguing that foreign blocking statutes exist largely as a response 
to the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws). But see F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. 
v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 168−69 (2004) (narrowly interpreting the extraterritoriality 
of certain antitrust provisions out of a concern for international comity). 
 105. See Price, supra note 104, at 325−26. 
 106. See Joseph E. Neuhaus, Note, The Power to Reverse Foreign Judgments:  The 
British Clawback Statute Under International Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1097−98 
(1981). 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id.; see also Nelson, supra note 24, at 5 (describing British and Canadian 
clawback statutes). 
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British Commonwealth adopted or voiced their support for similar 
statutes.109  In 1996, the European Union adopted a clawback measure 
intended to neutralize the effects of the Helms-Burton Act,110 a U.S. law 
that created a cause of action against individuals or companies engaged in 
the trafficking of former U.S. property seized by the Cuban government.111  
Under the EU measure, certain EU persons may “recover any damages, 
including legal costs” from a non-EU person.112  Most recently, Japan 
enacted a clawback statute allowing its citizens to recover damages paid out 
under the U.S. Anti-Dumping Act.113
Even in the absence of express statutory authorization, courts may 
sometimes seek to reverse a prior satisfied judgment.
 
114  For example, 
courts have reversed the satisfied judgment of a foreign forum on the 
grounds of jurisdictional deficiencies, lack of notice, fraud, or bias.115  
Foreign courts may also clawback a satisfied foreign judgment if it is 
inconsistent with international law or domestic public policy.116
Ultimately, foreign jurisdictions often attempt to clawback U.S. 
judgments in order to force a diplomatic solution to irreconcilable 
substantive policies.
 
117  Accordingly, while U.S. courts may be tempted to 
grant anti-foreign-suit injunctions to thwart foreign clawback attempts, it is 
also possible for the legislative and executive branches to pursue a 
diplomatic solution to the problem.118
C. Flying Too Close to the Sun, Part One:  The Limits of Federal Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction 
 
U.S. federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and derive their 
power solely from the U.S. Constitution or statute.119
 
 109. See Neuhaus, supra note 
  Thus, a party seeking 
federal jurisdiction has the burden of demonstrating federal power to 
106, at 1098. 
 110. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021−6091 (2006). 
 111. Jürgen Huber, The Helms-Burton Blocking Statute of the European Union, 20 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 699, 701 (1997). 
 112. See id. at 705. 
 113. See infra notes 226−29 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Neuhaus, supra note 106, at 1115−18 (collecting Anglo-American cases in 
which, absent statutory authorization, courts have reversed satisfied foreign judgments). 
 115. See id. at 1115. 
 116. See id. at 1117. 
 117. See id. at 1133 (“One of Britain’s prime reasons for enacting the clawback statute 
was to attempt to force a diplomatic solution to what it views as the excessive scope of 
United States trade regulations.”). 
 118. See infra Part II.D.1 (discussing the efforts of Congress and the State Department to 
address Japan’s anti-dumping clawback statute). 
 119. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) 
(“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.  They possess only that power authorized 
by Constitution and statute.”).  The Supreme Court has also recognized that federal courts 
have “inherent power” in limited circumstances, including “the inherent authority to appoint 
counsel to investigate and prosecute violation of a court’s order.” Id. at 380.  This Note does 
not address the scope of federal courts’ inherent power. 
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adjudicate the dispute.120
1.  Bases for Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
  This section first highlights the ordinary bases of 
federal subject matter jurisdiction.  It then discusses the doctrine of 
ancillary jurisdiction, which allows courts to adjudicate matters that would 
not independently satisfy the requirements of federal subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Finally, this section examines two lines of cases suggesting 
different rules regarding federal courts’ post-satisfaction ancillary 
jurisdiction. 
The two principal bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction are federal 
question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction.121  Under federal question 
jurisdiction, federal courts may adjudicate disputes regardless of the 
citizenship of the parties and the amount in controversy if the claim 
“aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”122  
Under diversity jurisdiction, federal courts may adjudicate state law 
disputes between citizens of different states if the amount in controversy 
exceeds $75,000.123
2.  The All Writs Act and Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 
The All Writs Act provides federal courts with authority to grant anti-suit 
injunctions.124
 
 120. See id. at 377 (“It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [federal courts’] limited 
jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 
jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)).  In contrast, “state courts are considered courts of plenary 
subject matter jurisdiction” and “[u]nless state law has limited the court’s jurisdiction to a 
particular subject matter or a particular federal claim is committed to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the federal courts, the state court can resolve disputes over any subject 
matter.” SILBERMAN ET AL., supra note 
  While federal courts have in the past attempted to assert the 
All Writs Act as an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction over 
71, at 301. 
 121. Other bases for which the Constitution provides original federal subject matter 
jurisdiction include disputes between the states, disputes affecting foreign diplomats, 
disputes to which the U.S. is a party, and disputes between citizens of a state and citizens of 
a foreign country. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 122. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall 
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution [and] Laws of the 
United States . . . .”).  Congress has committed certain claims to exclusive federal 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006) (securities); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333 (admiralty 
and maritime), 1334 (bankruptcy), 1338 (copyright and patent). 
 123. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall 
extend . . . to Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States . . . .”).  The Supreme 
Court has held that § 1332 (but not the Constitution), requires complete diversity of 
citizenship, i.e., no plaintiff may be the citizen of the same state as any defendant. See State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 
Cranch) 267 (1806).  Because complete diversity is not a constitutional requirement, 
Congress has allowed for federal jurisdiction under some circumstances when there is only 
minimal diversity, i.e., only one plaintiff is a citizen of a different state from one defendant. 
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d) (minimal diversity in class actions where the amount in 
controversy exceeds $5 million), 1369(a) (minimal diversity in disputes arising out of a mass 
disaster). 
 124. 28 U.S.C. § 2283; see supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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otherwise jurisdictionally defective claims,125 the Supreme Court put an 
end to this practice in Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson.126  In 
Syngenta, the Court held that the All Writs Act does not provide federal 
courts with independent subject matter jurisdiction over a suit.127  In 
addition, the Court held that it is not possible to create federal jurisdiction 
through the combination of the All Writs Act and the doctrine of ancillary 
jurisdiction.128
3.  The Doctrine of Ancillary Jurisdiction 
 
Federal courts are not strictly limited to adjudicating claims that 
independently satisfy a statutory basis for federal jurisdiction.  Under 
certain circumstances, federal courts have the power to adjudicate other 
matters through the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction.129  In its broadest 
sense, ancillary jurisdiction allows federal courts to exercise subject matter 
jurisdiction in furtherance of two purposes:  “(1) to permit disposition by a 
single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually 
interdependent, and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to 
manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its 
decrees.”130  The common law of ancillary jurisdiction, at least with regard 
to the first purpose, has been codified under the heading of supplemental 
jurisdiction.131
 
 125. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 256 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d in 
part and vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (holding that the All Writs Act justified 
removal to federal court of jurisdictionally defective state court claims to protect a federal 
class action judgment); In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1431 
(1993) (same). 
  The second purpose, regarding ancillary enforcement 
jurisdiction, is a “creature of necessity” that a court should only apply in 
“extraordinary circumstances” since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
already provide several mechanisms and procedures to facilitate the 
 126. 537 U.S. 28 (2002). 
 127. See id. at 34. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Ancillary jurisdiction is sometimes considered alongside the separate but related 
concept of pendent jurisdiction in the context of joinder of claims and parties.  Pendent 
jurisdiction is often used to refer to a plaintiff’s joinder of related state claims when 
jurisdiction is based on a federal question claim, while ancillary jurisdiction is used to refer 
to federal jurisdiction over “a jurisdictionally defective claim (whether asserted as a claim, 
counterclaim, or third-party claim) because of its close relationship to the plaintiff’s anchor 
federal claim (whether based on federal question or diversity jurisdiction).” SILBERMAN ET 
AL., supra note 71, at 379−80.  In the context of joinder of claims and parties, these two 
concepts are often deemed collectively “supplemental jurisdiction.” E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367 
(2006).  This Note does not use ancillary jurisdiction in contradistinction to pendant 
jurisdiction but rather employs the term in its broadest sense. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379 (1994); infra notes 162−71 and accompanying text. 
 130. Kokkonen, 375 U.S. at 379−80 (citations omitted). 
 131. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006); Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 354 n.5 (1996) 
(“Congress codified much of the common-law doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction as part of 
‘supplemental jurisdiction’ in 28 U.S.C. § 1367.”). 
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collection of judgment.132  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has suggested 
that there are few if any circumstances where a federal court may exercise 
ancillary jurisdiction in the absence of authorization by statute or the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.133
4.  Post-satisfaction Ancillary Jurisdiction 
 
There are two lines of Supreme Court precedent that can be understood to 
support contrary conclusions on the question of post-satisfaction ancillary 
jurisdiction.  On the one hand, certain Supreme Court cases from the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries upheld post-satisfaction exercises 
of jurisdiction and thus tend to support what this Note calls the permissive 
rule.  On the other hand, two more recent Supreme Court cases narrowly 
defined and applied ancillary jurisdiction and thus tend to support what this 
Note calls the restrictive rule on post-satisfaction ancillary jurisdiction. 
a.  The Permissive Rule 
Under the permissive rule, federal courts have broad post-satisfaction 
ancillary jurisdiction “to secure or preserve the fruits and advantages of a 
judgment or decree.”134  Various common law and equity doctrines, which 
permit courts to correct, amend, or vacate a judgment, demonstrate that 
post-satisfaction jurisdiction is not alien to common law jurisprudence.135  
Many of these principles are embodied in Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which allows relief from final judgment under several 
circumstances.136  These traditional common law and equitable powers, 
combined with Rule 60, make it clear that a court’s power over parties does 
not necessarily terminate once a judgment is satisfied.137
 
 132. See Peacock, 516 U.S. at 359 & n.7 (noting that Rule 69(a) permits judgment 
creditors to use any execution method authorized by the state in which the district court sits, 
and Rule 62(a) permits execution at any time following the judgment). 
 
 133. See id. 
 134. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 239 (1934). 
 135. As amici suggested, 
At common law . . . post-satisfaction powers included the power to correct a 
judgment, the power to amend a judgment to award additional monetary relief on 
related claims, the power to reopen a judgment based on newly discovered 
evidence, and the power to set a judgment aside.  Indeed, common-law pleading 
contained a series of writs now shrouded in ancient lore and mystery—such as the 
various writs of scire facias, the writ of audita querela, and the related writs of 
coram nobis and coram vobis,—that could be used after satisfaction of a judgment.  
Even more significant powers belonged to equity, which, after satisfaction, could 
set aside a judgment procured by fraud, mistake, or wrongful action. 
Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9−10, Goss Int’l Corp. v. 
Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd., 554 U.S. 917 (2008) (No. 07-618), 2007 WL 4340911, at 
*9−10 [hereinafter Brief for Law Professors] (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 136. Id. at 11.  Rule 60(e) explicitly preempts many of the common law writs. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 60(e) (“The following are abolished:  bills of review, bills in the nature of bills of 
review, and writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, and audita querela.”). 
 137. See Brief for Law Professors, supra note 135, at 11. 
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Nonetheless, the ability of a court to exercise power over parties after 
satisfaction as a matter of personal jurisdiction does not necessarily mean 
that federal courts always have ancillary subject matter jurisdiction to grant 
post-satisfaction relief.138  On this question, it is necessary to consult and 
draw inferences from scant Supreme Court precedent.139
One potentially instructive case is Pacific Railroad of Missouri v. 
Missouri Pacific Railway Co.
 
140  In that case, a New York citizen had 
brought an initial diversity action in equity against a Missouri railroad 
company to foreclose a mortgage.141  The trial court ordered foreclosure 
and sale of the property.142  The railroad subsequently brought a bill in 
equity—which did not independently meet any criteria for federal 
jurisdiction—claiming that the decree in the initial action was based on 
fraud.143  The Supreme Court held that the district court had ancillary 
jurisdiction to hear the fraud claim because “[o]n the question of 
jurisdiction the suit may be regarded as ancillary to [the previous action], so 
that the relief asked may be granted . . . without regard to the citizenship of 
the present parties.”144
Dietzsch v. Huidekoper is another case that may support the permissive 
rule.
 
145  In that case, the plaintiff brought a replevin suit in state court.146  
The defendant removed the case to federal court, which ruled that the 
plaintiff was not entitled to the replevied property.147  Nevertheless, the 
state court continued to adjudicate the dispute and ruled in favor of the 
plaintiff.148
 
 138. See id. at 11−12. 
  The defendant then moved for an anti-suit injunction against 
 139. See id. 
 140. 111 U.S. 505 (1884); Brief for Law Professors, supra note 135, at 13 (relying on 
Pacific Railroad in support of the permissive rule on ancillary jurisdiction). 
 141. See Pacific Railroad, 111 U.S. at 506−07. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. at 507. 
 144. Id. at 522.  It is likely that under the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such 
an action would be permitted. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3) (“On motion and just terms, the 
court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons:  . . . (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or 
misconduct by an opposing party . . . .”). 
 145. 103 U.S. 494 (1880); see, e.g., Brief for Law Professors, supra note 135, at 14 (“In 
combination, Pacific Railroad and Dietzsch show that a federal court possesses the 
necessary jurisdiction to issue an anti-suit injunction even after all proceedings in the 
original action have concluded.”); Brief in Opposition at 33, PT Pertamina v. Karaha Bodas 
Co., 554 U.S. 929 (2008) (No. 07-619), 2007 WL 4365700, at *33 [hereinafter Karaha 
Bodas Opposition] (arguing that Dietzsch demonstrates that “[f]ederal courts maintain 
continuing jurisdiction to protect their final judgments, even after satisfaction”); Brief of the 
United States as Amicus Curiae in Opposition at 12, Karaha Bodas, 554 U.S. 929 (No. 07-
619), 2008 WL 2185729, at *12 [hereinafter Brief for United States in Karaha Bodas] 
(citing Dietzsch in support of the permissive rule and contending that it is still good law); 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 32−34, Goss Int’l. Corp. v. Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd., 
554 U.S. 917 (2008) (No. 07-618), 2007 WL 3353450, at *32−34 [hereinafter Goss Petition] 
(arguing that the Eighth Circuit’s decision on ancillary jurisdiction is inconsistent with 
Dietzsch). 
 146. See Dietzsch, 103 U.S. at 495−96. 
 147. See id. at 495. 
 148. See id. 
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plaintiffs, enjoining them from collecting on the replevin bond in state 
court.  Because the replevin bond would have effectively nullified its ruling, 
the federal court issued the injunction.149  The Supreme Court upheld the 
injunction, holding that the district court had ancillary jurisdiction to enjoin 
the plaintiffs from collecting on the property in state court.150  The Court 
reasoned that if the federal court had not enjoined the state court action, the 
defendants would have found “themselves in precisely the same plight as if 
the judgment [in the federal case] had been against them, instead of for 
them” and would have deprived them of the “substantial fruits of a 
judgment rendered in their favor.”151
The final case lending support to the permissive rule is Dugas v. 
American Surety Co.
 
152  In that case a surety brought an interpleader action 
against several claimants to a limited fund.153  The court distributed the 
proceeds on a pro rata basis.154  One of the claimants, Dugas, then brought 
a suit in state court to recover more than his apportioned share.155  In 
response, the surety company filed a bill in federal court to enjoin Dugas 
from proceeding in state court.156
[t]he jurisdiction to entertain the supplemental bill is free from doubt.  
Such a bill may be brought in a federal court in aid of and to effectuate its 
prior decree to the end either that the decree may be carried fully into 
execution or that it may be given fuller effect, but subject to the 
qualification that the relief be not of a different kind or on a different 
principle.
  The federal court granted the anti-suit 
injunction, holding that 
157
It is important to note that in Dugas the federal district court’s original 
order contained an injunction against state proceedings.
 
158  In addition, 
federal law explicitly provided for the use of anti-suit injunctions in such 
circumstances.159
 
 149. See id. 
 
 150. Id. at 497 (“The bill in this case was, therefore, ancillary to the replevin suit, and was 
in substance a proceeding in the Federal court to enforce its own judgment by preventing the 
defeated party from wresting the replevied property from the plaintiffs in replevin . . . .”). 
 151. Id. at 498. 
 152. 300 U.S. 414 (1937); see, e.g., Brief for United States in Karaha Bodas, supra note 
145, at 12 (citing Dugas in support of the permissive rule on ancillary jurisdiction); Goss 
Petition, supra note 145, at 33 (noting that in Dugas the Supreme Court “upheld an antisuit 
injunction to protect the integrity of a final monetary judgment”). 
 153. See Dugas, 300 U.S. at 418. 
 154. See id. at 419. 
 155. See id. at 420. 
 156. See id. at 421. 
 157. See id. at 428. 
 158. The district court’s order “[e]njoin[ed] each of the defendants from instituting or 
prosecuting in any state court, or in any other federal court, any suit against [the surety 
company] on account of any right or claim growing out of [the common fund].” Id. at 419. 
 159. See Federal Interpleader Act of 1926 § 2, Pub. L. No. 69-203, 44 Stat. 416, 416 (“[A 
federal] court shall have power to issue its process for all . . . claimants and to issue an order 
of injunction against each of them, enjoining them from instituting or prosecuting any suit or 
proceeding in any State court or in any other Federal court [regarding the common fund in 
question].”). 
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While there is no case directly supporting the permissive rule, the history 
of common law writs and equitable powers, combined with the holdings of 
Pacific Railroad, Dietzsch, and Dugas, make it plausible that a federal court 
has ancillary jurisdiction to issue a post-satisfaction anti-suit injunction.160
 b.  The Restrictive Rule 
 
The restrictive rule proposes a narrower conception of ancillary 
jurisdiction that bars federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims 
that are “entirely new and original” or “of a different kind or [based] on a 
different principle.”161
Proponents of the restrictive rule rely heavily on the 1994 Supreme Court 
case Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America for support.
  This rule draws support from two recent Supreme 
Court cases. 
162  
In that case, the parties litigated state claims and counterclaims in a 
diversity action in federal court that ultimately resulted in a settlement.163  
Pursuant to a recitation of the terms of the settlement, the district court 
judge dismissed all claims with prejudice in accordance with Rule 
41(a)(1)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.164  The order did not 
reserve jurisdiction in the district court or make reference to the terms of the 
settlement agreement.165  After a dispute over the terms of the settlement 
agreement, one of the parties moved in the district court to enforce it.166  
The Supreme Court ruled that there was no ancillary jurisdiction to hear the 
claim for the breach of the settlement agreement.167
The Court held that federal courts may exercise ancillary jurisdiction:  (1) 
to permit the disposition of related claims, and (2) to enable a court to 
“function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its 
authority, and effectuate its decrees.”
 
168  In this case, ancillary jurisdiction 
could not be based on the first purpose because the original claim and the 
“breach of [the] settlement agreement ha[d] nothing to do with each 
other.”169
 
 160. See Brief for Law Professors, supra note 
  The district court was also unable to avail itself of the second 
purpose of ancillary jurisdiction, because “[the district court’s] only 
order . . . was that the suit be dismissed, a disposition that is in no way 
135, at 14. 
 161. Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 358 (1996) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 162. 511 U.S. 375 (1994); see, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19−20, PT 
Pertamina v. Karaha Bodas Co., 554 U.S. 929 (2008) (No. 07-619), 2007 WL 3353451, at 
*19−20 [hereinafter Karaha Bodas Petition] (citing Kokkonen in support of the restrictive 
rule). 
 163. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. 
 164. Id. at 376−77.  A “plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by 
filing . . . a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
41(a)(1)(ii). 
 165. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. 
 166. See id. at 377. 
 167. See id. at 381−82. 
 168. Id. at 379−80. 
 169. Id. at 380. 
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flouted or imperiled by the alleged breach of the settlement agreement.”170
[t]he situation would be quite different if the parties’ obligation to comply 
with the terms of the settlement agreement had been made part of the 
order of dismissal—either by separate provision (such as a provision 
“retaining jurisdiction” over the settlement agreement) or by 
incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order.
  
The Court went on to note that 
171
The restrictive rule also finds support in Peacock v. Thomas.
 
172  In that 
case, a judgment creditor tried to collect from the officer of a debtor 
corporation that had been found liable in a prior federal action.173  While 
there was jurisdiction in the initial action under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act174 (ERISA), the Court found that there was no 
ancillary jurisdiction over the subsequent claim between non-diverse 
parties.175
The Court held that the subsequent action was not justified under either 
purpose of ancillary jurisdiction.
 
176  First, the subsequent claim to collect 
from the corporation’s officer was not sufficiently factually related to the 
original claim.177  Second, the Court adopted a narrow view of its ancillary 
enforcement jurisdiction, holding that it does not extend “beyond attempts 
to execute, or to guarantee eventual executability of, a federal judgment.”178  
Finally, the Supreme Court noted that parties should look to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure as the principal means of enforcing a judgment,179 
further stating that while “[t]he Rules cannot guarantee payment of every 
federal judgment . . . as long as they protect a judgment creditor’s ability to 
execute on a judgment, the district court’s authority is adequately 
preserved.”180
Both Kokkonen and Peacock stand for a narrow approach to ancillary 
jurisdiction, grounded in a narrow reading of the terms of the court’s final 
order.
 
181
 
 170. Id. at 380−81. 
  Under these cases, and the restrictive rule which they support, a 
federal court lacks ancillary jurisdiction over subsequent jurisdictionally 
defective claims unless such claims implicate the terms of the court’s final 
 171. Id. at 381. 
 172. 516 U.S. 349 (1996); see, e.g., Karaha Bodas Petition, supra note 162, at 20 (“In the 
recent Kokkonen and Peacock decisions, [the Supreme Court] emphasized that ancillary 
jurisdiction extends only to matters truly necessary to protect the court’s authority to manage 
the proceedings before it.”). 
 173. See Peacock, 516 U.S. at 352. 
 174. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). 
 175. See Peacock, 516 U.S. at 359−60. 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. at 355−56 (“[T]here is insufficient factual dependence between the claims 
raised in [plaintiff’s] first and second suits to justify the extension of ancillary 
jurisdiction . . . .  The claims in these cases have little or no factual or logical 
interdependence . . . .”). 
 178. Id. at 357. 
 179. See id. at 359 (noting the Federal Rules’ “fast and effective mechanisms for 
execution”). 
 180. Id. 
 181. See Karaha Bodas Petition, supra note 162, at 18−20. 
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order or the federal court expressly retains jurisdiction over subsequent 
disputes.182
D.  Flying Too Close to the Sun, Part Two:  The Limits of International 
Comity 
 
This section addresses the limits comity places on anti-foreign-suit 
injunctions.  First, this section briefly examines the origins and meaning of 
international comity.  It then discusses the role of comity in anti-foreign-
suit injunctions through an examination of an ongoing circuit split on the 
question. 
1.  International Comity 
Comity is a vague and indeterminate doctrine under which courts must 
sometimes apply foreign law or decline jurisdiction in favor of a foreign 
forum.183  In general, the doctrine of comity exists in recognition of the 
effects that private disputes can have on the interests of foreign 
sovereigns.184  For example, the Act of State doctrine and foreign sovereign 
immunity, are rooted in international comity.185
The Supreme Court has consistently held that U.S. courts must respect 
international comity.
 
186
 
 182. See id. 
  Recently, the Supreme Court held in Republic of 
the Philippines v. Pimentel that “[t]here is a comity interest in allowing a 
foreign state to use its own courts for a dispute if it has a right to do so.  The 
dignity of a foreign state is not enhanced if other nations bypass its courts 
 183. See Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Summer 2008, at 19, 19 (2008). 
  Scholars and courts have characterized international comity inconsistently as a 
choice-of-law principle, a synonym for private international law, a rule of public 
international law, a moral obligation, expediency, courtesy, reciprocity, utility, or 
diplomacy.  Authorities disagree as to whether comity is a rule of natural law, 
custom, treaty, or domestic law . . . .  Although other jurisdictions sometimes 
employ the term comity as a synonym for diplomatic immunity, in the United 
States comity has served as a principle of deference to foreign law and foreign 
courts. 
Id. at 19−20. 
 184. See id. at 19. 
 185. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 50, at 765 (mentioning comity as a justification 
for the Act of State doctrine).  The Act of State doctrine prevents U.S. courts from “sit[ting] 
in judgment on the validity of the public acts of foreign sovereigns within their own 
territory.” Id. at 751.  The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1602 (2006), holds that, subject to exceptions, U.S. courts lack subject matter jurisdiction 
over foreign sovereigns. See id. at 219−23; see also Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel, 
553 U.S. 851, 852 (2008) (“Giving full effect to sovereign immunity promotes the comity 
and dignity interests that contributed to the development of the immunity doctrine.”). 
 186. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v.  Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004) 
(holding that comity requires U.S. courts to apply a limited interpretation of U.S. antitrust 
laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 165 (1895) 
(“‘[Comity] contributes so largely to promote justice between individuals, and to produce a 
friendly intercourse between the sovereignties to which they belong, that courts of justice 
have continually acted upon it, as a part of the voluntary law of nations.’” (quoting Bank of 
Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 589 (1839)). 
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without right or good cause.”187  The Supreme Court also noted that comity 
is such an important policy that the U.S. should apply the principle even if 
it may leave a party “with no immediate way to recover on its 
judgment.”188
2.  The Conservative-Liberal Circuit Split 
 
a.  Genuflecting Before Omnipotent Comity:  The Conservative Approach 
A majority of federal circuits, including the U.S. Courts of Appeals for 
the First,189 Second,190 Third,191 Sixth,192 Eighth,193 and D.C. Circuits,194 
follow the conservative approach to anti-foreign-suit injunctions.195  Under 
the conservative approach, a court may issue an anti-foreign-suit injunction 
only if:  (1) an action in a foreign forum would thwart U.S. jurisdiction or 
would threaten vital U.S. policy and (2) the domestic concerns outweigh 
considerations of international comity.196
While the circuits have articulated slightly different tests,
 
197
 
 187. Pimentel, 553 U.S. at 866. 
 the 
conservative approach’s key feature is its substantial deference to 
international comity, mandating that injunctions be used sparingly and in 
 188. Id. at 872. 
 189. See, e.g., Quaak v. KPMG Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 190. See, e.g., Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi 
Negara, 500 F.3d 111, 119−20 (2d Cir. 2007); China Trade and Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong 
Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 34, 36−37 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 191. See, e.g., Stonington Partners, Inc. v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prods. N.V., 310 
F.3d 118, 127 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 192. See, e.g., Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1351, 1355 (6th Cir. 
1992). 
 193. See Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491 F.3d 
355, 361 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 194. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 
927−33 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 195. See generally Taryn M. Fry, Note, Injunction Junction, What’s Your Function?  
Resolving the Split over Antisuit Injunction Deference in Favor of International Comity, 58 
CATH. U. L. REV. 1071 (2009) (discussing the conservative–liberal split on anti-foreign-suit 
injunctions).  The terms “conservative” and “liberal” should not be understood in a political 
sense.  Rather, they refer to the relative willingness of courts to issue anti-foreign-suit 
injunctions. See, e.g., Goss, 491 F.3d at 359 (discussing the “conservative” and “liberal” 
approaches to anti-foreign-suit injunctions); Quaak v. KPMG Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11, 
17 (1st Cir. 2004) (“For ease in reference, we shall call the more permissive of these views 
the liberal approach and the more restrictive of them the conservative approach.”).   The 
heading for this section refers to a critique of the conservative approach in Kaepa, Inc. v. 
Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996) (“We decline . . . to require a district court 
to genuflect before a vague and omnipotent notion of comity every time that it must decide 
whether to enjoin a foreign action.”). 
 196. See, e.g., Goss, 491 F.3d at 359. 
 197. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Blackman, Provisional Measures in Cross-Border Cases, in 
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION STRATEGIES AND PRACTICE, supra note 45, at 71 (“The First 
Circuit . . . has taken what can be characterized as an ‘intermediate’ approach to antisuit 
injunctions against foreign litigation.”); Nelson, supra note 24, at 4 (“The First, Second, and 
District of Columbia Circuits endorse a slightly less radical version . . . of the conservative 
approach to comity . . . .”). 
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only the most compelling situations.198  The conservative approach 
maintains that even though an anti-foreign-suit injunction binds individual 
parties, it “effectively restricts the jurisdiction of the court of a foreign 
sovereign.”199  Consequently, anti-foreign-suit injunctions always implicate 
international comity.200  Nevertheless, while some courts have advocated 
for international comity in passionate and even moralistic terms,201 the 
conservative approach’s “rebuttable presumption against issuing 
international antisuit injunctions”202 is not insurmountable.203
b.  Imposing the Hegemon’s Will:  The Liberal   Approach 
 
A minority of circuits, including the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Fifth,204 Seventh,205 and Ninth Circuits,206 follow the liberal approach to 
anti-foreign-suit injunctions.207  Under the liberal approach, a court may 
issue an anti-foreign-suit injunction if it is necessary to prevent vexatious 
and oppressive litigation or if the foreign action would result in inequitable 
hardship or delay, or would frustrate the efficient determination of the 
case.208
 
 198. See Goss, 491 F.3d at 360; China Trade and Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 
F.2d 33, 35−36 (2d Cir. 1987); Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927. 
  While the liberal approach does not completely disregard 
international comity, it gives it little deference in disputes that implicate 
 199. China Trade, 837 F.2d at 35−36. 
 200. See Goss, 491 F.3d at 360. 
 201. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 941 (justifying deference to international comity by 
reference to Kant’s “ethical imperative that everyone should act as if his actions were 
universalized”);  Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354 (6th  Cir. 1992) 
(“The days of American hegemony over international economic affairs have long since 
passed.  The United States cannot today impose its economic will on the rest of the world 
and expect meek compliance, if indeed it ever could.  The modern era . . . requires 
cooperation and comity between nations.”). 
 202. See Goss, 491 F.3d at 360 (quoting Quaak v. KPMG Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11, 
18 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
 203. Compare BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 50, at 542 (“The District of Columbia, 
Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have held that foreign anti-suit injunctions should virtually 
never be issued.” (emphasis added)), with Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 929 (applying the 
conservative approach and upholding anti-foreign-suit injunctions against parties seeking to 
avoid U.S. antitrust laws by bringing declaratory suits in the United Kingdom), and Karaha 
Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 500 F.3d 111 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (applying the conservative approach and upholding an anti-foreign-suit injunction 
against a party seeking to collaterally attack an arbitral award in a foreign court). 
 204. See, e.g., Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 626−27 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 205. See, e.g., Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys. Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
 206. See, e.g., Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. Nat’l Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 
856 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 207. See Fry, supra note 195, at 1079 (listing the circuits following the liberal approach).  
The heading for this section is based on the critique of the liberal approach found in Gau 
Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354 (6th  Cir. 1992). See also supra note 
201 (quoting Gau Shan). 
 208. See Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491 F.3d 
355, 360 (8th Cir. 2007) (considering, but ultimately rejecting, the liberal approach); Kaepa, 
76 F.3d at 626−27. 
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only the interests of private parties.209  According to the Ninth Circuit, 
“[t]he strict cases [following the conservative approach] presume a threat to 
international comity whenever an injunction is sought,” while courts 
following the liberal approach require evidence “that comity is likely to be 
impaired in this case.”210
In spite of the professed allegiance of certain circuits to either the liberal 
or conservative approach, it is not always possible to predict the degree of 
deference that district courts will grant to comity.  For example, both the 
Second and Eighth Circuits follow the conservative approach,
 
211
II.  CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO JURISDICTION AND COMITY 
 yet the 
courts reached starkly different conclusions in Goss and Karaha Bodas. 
These two cases suggest that the issue of comity in anti-foreign-suit 
injunctions continues to vex courts.  The possibility of post-satisfaction 
anti-foreign-suit injunctions further complicates matters. 
Part II examines the conflict arising from the circuit split between the 
Eighth and Second Circuits on the question of whether a court may 
maintain an anti-foreign-suit injunction after the satisfaction of judgment.  
This part separately addresses the questions of jurisdiction and comity in 
each decision.  It then briefly discusses the respective petitions for certiorari 
in Goss and Karaha Bodas, as well as the aftermath of each case. 
A.  Goss:  Courts May Not Grant Anti-foreign-suit Injunctions After 
Judgment Is Satisfied 
1.  Facts 
Goss International Corporation, a company based in the United States, 
and Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd. (TKS), a Japan-based company, were in 
the business of manufacturing and supplying printing presses for 
newspapers in the U.S.212  In the 1970s, TKS entered the U.S. market and 
within a decade had obtained contracts with major newspapers such as the 
Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post.213  TKS’s success continued 
between 1991 and 2000, due in large part to its practice of selling printing 
presses in the U.S. at prices significantly lower than the Japanese market 
price—a practice known as “dumping.”214
 
 209. See Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 626−27 (noting that comity concerns are diminished because 
“no public international issue is implicated by the case”). 
  During this period, TKS sold 
 210. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys. Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 211. See, e.g., Goss, 491 F.3d at 355, 368 (adopting the conservative approach for the 
Eighth Circuit); China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 40 (2d Cir. 
1987) (adopting a form of the conservative approach for the Second Circuit). 
 212. See Goss, 491 F.3d at 356−57. 
 213. See id. 
 214. See id.  Dumping is “[t]he act of selling a large quantity of goods at less than fair 
value” or “[s]elling goods abroad at less than the market price at home.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 576 (9th ed. 2009). 
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$125 million worth of printing presses in the United States, while Goss lost 
contracts because it was unable to compete.215
In 2000, Goss brought a federal civil action against TKS in the Northern 
District of Iowa
 
216 alleging violations of the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916,217 
which made it unlawful to sell “articles within the United States at a price 
substantially less than the actual market value or wholesale price of such 
articles, at the time of exportation to the United States, in the principal 
markets of the country of their production.”218  The law subjected violators 
to treble damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.219
In 2003, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Goss, awarding $10,539,949 
in damages.
 
220  After trebling this amount and adding attorney’s fees and 
costs, the district court awarded Goss $35,785,480.05.221  TKS appealed to 
the Eighth Circuit.222
In December 2004, while appeal was pending, Congress repealed the 
Anti-Dumping Act.
 
223  The repeal was prospective and therefore did not 
affect the outcome of the Goss-TKS litigation.224  Congress repealed the 
law in compliance with a determination of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), which found that the U.S. anti-dumping law violated agreements 
committing disputes over dumping to the jurisdiction of the WTO.225
Japan argued that the U.S. repeal did not comply with the WTO’s 
requirements because it did not affect pending litigation.
 
226  Consequently, 
Japan enacted the Special Measures Law, a clawback statute granting 
Japanese citizens a cause of action in Japanese courts to recover the full 
amount of judgments paid out under the Anti-Dumping Act.227  The law 
held parent companies and subsidiaries of the prevailing party in U.S. court 
jointly and severally liable.228  Accordingly, Tokyo-based Goss Graphic 
Systems Japan, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Goss, would have faced 
exposure under the Special Measures Law.229
TKS agreed not to file suit under the Japanese law while appeal was 
pending in U.S. courts.
 
230
 
 215. See Goss, 491 F.3d at 357. 
  In January 2006, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the 
 216. See id. 
 217. Pub. L. No. 64-271, §§ 800−01, 39 Stat. 756, 798, repealed by Pub. Law 108-429, 
§ 2006, 118 Stat. 2434, 2597 (2004). 
 218. Id. 
 219. See id. 
 220. Goss, 491 F.3d at 357. 
 221. See id. at 357−58. 
 222. See id. at 358. 
 223. See id. 
 224. See id. 
 225. See id. at 358 & n.3. 
 226. See id. at 358; see also Nelson, supra note 24, at 2.  The judgment in Goss was the 
only relief ever granted under the Anti-Dumping Act. See Goss, 491 F.3d at 358 n.3. 
 227. See Goss, 491 F.3d at 358; see also supra note 27. 
 228. See Goss, 491 F.3d at 358. 
 229. See id. 
 230. See id. at 358−59. 
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jury verdict.231  The Supreme Court denied certiorari in June 2006.232  
When the Supreme Court denied TKS’s petition, TKS informed Goss that it 
intended to file suit in Japan under the Special Measures Law.233  The 
district court granted Goss’s motion for an anti-suit injunction prohibiting 
TKS from bringing suit in Japan.234  TKS quickly satisfied the judgment 
and then appealed the anti-suit injunction.235  The Eighth Circuit vacated 
the injunction.236
2.  Goss’s Treatment of Jurisdiction 
 
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis of ancillary jurisdiction by 
observing that the All Writs Act, which gives courts the power to issue anti-
suit injunctions, “does not create an independent source of federal 
jurisdiction.”237  The court noted that while the district court had 
maintained jurisdiction over the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this 
jurisdiction ceased once TKS paid the judgment, inferring that ancillary 
jurisdiction must logically conclude upon satisfaction.238  The Eighth 
Circuit noted that the judgment “is rendered, paid and satisfied.  No 
pending litigation, other than this appeal, remains in the United States 
courts . . . .  Neither the All Writs Act nor the court’s ancillary enforcement 
jurisdiction provides the district court with a separate source of jurisdiction 
to enjoin TKS under these circumstances.”239
While the Eighth Circuit did not address the jurisdictional issue in depth, 
it clearly adopted the restrictive rule.
 
240  The court quoted an 1867 Supreme 
Court decision, Riggs v. Johnson County,241 which stated that “the 
jurisdiction of a court is not exhausted by the rendition . . . but continues 
until that judgment shall be satisfied.”242  The court interpreted Riggs to 
suggest that jurisdiction must not only continue until the satisfaction of 
judgment but also that it must cease at the satisfaction of judgment.243  The 
court did not discuss Peacock or Kokonnen in any detail, but cited Peacock 
favorably in its adoption of the restrictive rule.244
 
 231. Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 434 F.3d 1081 
(8th Cir. 2006). 
 
 232. Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd. v. Goss Int’l Corp., 547 U.S. 1180 (2006). 
 233. See Goss, 491 F.3d at 359. 
 234. See id. at 357. 
 235. See id. 
 236. See id. 
 237. See id. at 364 (citing Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc., v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 31 (2002)); 
see also supra notes 126−28 and accompanying text. 
 238. See Goss, 491 F.3d at 365. 
 239. Id.  This language echoes Syngenta, which held that “[t]he All Writs Act, alone or in 
combination with the existence of ancillary jurisdiction in a federal court, is not a substitute” 
for independent subject matter jurisdiction. Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 34. 
 240. See supra Part I.C.4.b. 
 241. 73 U.S. 167 (1867). 
 242. Id. at 187; Goss, 491 F.3d at 365. 
 243. Goss, 491 F.3d at 365 (“Thus, the district court retained ancillary enforcement 
jurisdiction until satisfaction of the judgment.”). 
 244. See id. at 365. 
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3.  Goss’s Treatment of International Comity 
Prior to Goss, the Eighth Circuit had not had the occasion to adopt a 
standard for anti-foreign-suit injunctions.245  Consequently, the decision 
includes significant treatment of the degree to which a court should defer to 
international comity, both as a general matter and when a party has already 
satisfied judgment.246
The Eighth Circuit observed that the circuit split regarding anti-foreign-
suit injunctions revolves around the respective degrees of deference that 
courts afford international comity.
 
247  The court noted that “[a]though 
comity eludes a precise definition, its importance in our globalized 
economy cannot be overstated,”248 and cited cases describing comity as 
“‘the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the 
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation’”249 or the equivalent 
of “‘courtesy, politeness, convenience or goodwill between sovereigns, a 
moral necessity, expediency, reciprocity or consideration of high 
international politics concerned with maintaining amicable and workable 
relationships between nations.’”250  The Eighth Circuit ultimately adopted 
the conservative approach to international comity, noting that “the Congress 
and the President possess greater experience with, knowledge of, and 
expertise in international trade and economics than does the Judiciary.  The 
two other branches, not the Judiciary, bear the constitutional duties related 
to foreign affairs.”251
The Eighth Circuit found that considerations of comity required it to 
vacate the district court’s anti-suit injunction.  The court declined to enjoin 
the Japanese action because it involved different issues than the litigation in 
the Eighth Circuit.
 
252  The court also noted that while the doctrine of res 
judicata normally outweighs issues of comity once one court reaches 
judgment in parallel proceedings, this concept was inapplicable because the 
Japanese action regarded a completely different issue.253
The court then contended that the Japanese action did not threaten any 
vital U.S. policies.  The court distinguished Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, 
Belgian World Airlines, which involved “a head-on collision between the 
diametrically opposed antitrust policies of the United States and United 
Kingdom”
 
254
 
 245. See id. at 359 (“The propriety of issuing a foreign antisuit injunction is a matter of 
first impression for our circuit.”). 
 from Goss, which involved the first and only application of 
 246. See id. 
 247. See id.; see also supra Part I.D. 
 248. Goss, 491 F.3d at 360. 
 249. Id. (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)). 
 250. Id. (quoting Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1519 n.10 
(11th Cir. 1994)). 
 251. Id. at 361. 
 252. See id. at 366. 
 253. See id. at 365−66. 
 254. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 916 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984). 
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the Anti-Dumping Act.255  Consequently, the court concluded that “the 
district court . . . placed too much emphasis on the impact of the Special 
Measures Law on United States public policy” in issuing the anti-foreign-
suit injunction.256
B.  Karaha Bodas:  Federal Courts May Grant Post-satisfaction 
Anti-foreign-suit Injunctions 
 
1.  Facts 
In 1994, Karaha Bodas Company (KBC), a Cayman Islands limited 
liability company owned by American power companies and other 
investors, entered into a joint venture with Pertamina, an Indonesian state-
owned and controlled oil and gas company.257  The purpose of the joint 
venture was to explore and develop geothermal resources in Indonesia.258  
The joint venture was to be governed by Indonesian law, and the parties 
agreed to settle all disputes through binding arbitration according to the 
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) in Geneva, Switzerland.259
In 1998, the Indonesian government suspended the joint venture and 
KBC began arbitration proceedings in Switzerland demanding $600 million 
in damages and lost profits.
 
260  Although Pertamina argued that KBC 
lacked a bona fide intention to carry out the project and induced the contract 
through faulty representations, the arbitration panel found for KBC and 
awarded $261 million in damages, lost profits, costs of arbitration, and 
interest.261
In 2001, KBC brought suit in the Southern District of Texas to confirm 
the arbitral award under the New York Convention.
 
262  The district court 
confirmed the award and entered judgment for $261 million plus interest.263
While Pertamina appealed the Texas district court’s decision, it also filed 
an action in Jakarta, Indonesia, collaterally attacking the arbitral award and 
seeking to enjoin KBC from enforcing judgment.
 
264  The Texas district 
court issued an anti-suit injunction in the form of a temporary restraining 
order prohibiting Pertamina from seeking relief in Indonesia.265
 
 255. See Goss, 491 F.3d at 366. 
  
Meanwhile, in Indonesia, Pertamina obtained nullification of the arbitral 
award and an injunction prohibiting KBC from enforcing the arbitral award 
 256. See id. at 366. 
 257. See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 
500 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 258. See id. 
 259. See id. 
 260. See id. 
 261. See id. at 114. 
 262. See id.; see also supra notes 97−100 and accompanying text (discussing the New 
York Convention). 
 263. See Karaha Bodas, 500 F.3d at 114. 
 264. See id. 
 265. See id. 
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and exacting a fine of $500,000 for each day of non-compliance.266  The 
Texas district court responded by issuing a counter-injunction prohibiting 
Pertamina from enforcing the Indonesian injunction or collecting penalties 
under the injunction.267
While the Indonesian court’s injunction was on appeal before the 
Indonesian Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s 
anti-suit injunction.  The Fifth Circuit ruled that since the Texas District 
Court was only a court of secondary jurisdiction under the New York 
Convention, it was not the court’s role to protect KBC from every legal 
hardship, especially since the New York Convention anticipates and 
provides for multiple and simultaneous proceedings.
 
268
In 2004, three years after KBC initiated proceedings in Texas, the 
litigation reached a degree of resolution.  The Indonesian Supreme Court 
vacated the Indonesian trial court’s anti-suit injunction and held that only a 
Swiss court could annul the arbitral award.
 
269  In addition, the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the arbitral award and also 
concluded that only a Swiss court could annul the award.270
Because Pertamina did not post a supersedeas bond following the Texas 
district court’s confirmation of the arbitral award, it was not able to obtain a 
stay of judgment pending its appeal in the Fifth Circuit.
 
271  Consequently, 
in 2002, KBC sought registration and enforcement of the arbitral award in 
the Southern District of New York, where Pertamina maintained bank 
accounts containing hundreds of millions of dollars.272
After four years of litigation regarding the ownership of the bank 
accounts in question, the Southern District of New York ordered Pertamina 
to pay KBC $319 million from the accounts.
 
273  The Second Circuit 
affirmed in March 2006.274  The Supreme Court denied certiorari on 
October 2, 2006275 and on October 10, 2006, Pertamina satisfied most of 
the judgment.276
 
 266. See id. 
 
 267. See id. 
 268. See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 
335 F.3d 357, 364−65 (5th Cir. 2003); Karaha Bodas, 500 F.3d at 114−15. 
 269. See Karaha Bodas, 500 F.3d at 115. 
 270. See id. 
 271. See id. at 116; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d) (“If an appeal is taken, the appellant 
may obtain a stay by supersedeas bond . . . .”).  A supersedeas bond is “[a]n appellant’s bond 
to stay execution on a judgment during the pendency of the appeal.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 214, at 202. 
 272. See Karaha Bodas, 500 F.3d at 116.  KBC also brought actions to confirm the 
arbitral award in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Canada resulting in the collection of $900,000. 
See id.  Over the course of the entire dispute, Pertamina hailed KBC into more than fifteen 
courts in seven countries over a nine-year period. See id. at 127 n.18. 
 273. See id. at 116. 
 274. See id. 
 275. See id. at 117. 
 276. See id.  Pertamina paid the small remainder of the judgment on November 29, 2006. 
See id. at 117 n.6. 
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Pertamina filed an action in the Cayman Islands on September 15, 
2006.277  Pertamina argued that the award was based on fraud and sought 
damages in the amount of the judgment it had paid to KBC.278  While 
Pertamina reprised some of its earlier arguments before the arbitration 
tribunal, it also claimed that more recent revelations showed that KBC had 
committed fraud.279
Upon KBC’s motion, the Southern District issued an anti-suit injunction 
prohibiting Pertamina from maintaining its action in the Cayman Islands or 
elsewhere, and allowing KBC to dispose of the judgment collected from 
Pertamina.
 
280  On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
judgment.281
2.  Karaha Bodas’s Treatment of Jurisdiction 
 
After oral argument, the Second Circuit requested supplemental briefs on 
the question of whether the district court possessed ancillary jurisdiction to 
grant an anti-suit injunction.282
a.  Arguments for Ancillary Jurisdiction 
  These briefs contained arguments regarding 
the proper rule for post-satisfaction ancillary jurisdiction and its application 
to the case.  While the Second Circuit ultimately adopted the permissive 
rule, it unfortunately did not explain its reasoning in depth.  It is therefore 
instructive to examine in some detail the arguments that the parties 
advanced in their supplemental briefs. 
The appellee, KBC, presented five main arguments in favor of ancillary 
jurisdiction.  First, KBC contended that Supreme Court precedent 
authorizes post-satisfaction ancillary jurisdiction.  In particular, KBC 
highlighted Dietzsch and Dugas in support of its proposition that “[f]ederal 
courts maintain continuing jurisdiction to protect their final judgments, 
even after satisfaction.”283  KBC also pointed out that, contrary to the 
Eighth Circuit’s assertion, Peacock “did not hold . . . that [ancillary 
enforcement jurisdiction] automatically ends once the judgment is 
satisfied.”284  In any event, KBC argued, Peacock should be limited to 
cases involving attempts to bring ancillary claims against third parties.285
 
 277. See id. 
 
 278. See id. 
 279. See id. 
 280. See id. at 117−18. 
 281. See id. at 113. 
 282. See id. at 127.  The court ordered the supplemental briefs as a result of the Goss 
decision, which the Eighth Circuit decided after oral arguments in Karaha Bodas. See id. 
 283. Supplemental Letter Brief for Appellee at 1−2, Karaha Bodas, 500 F.3d 111 (No. 
07-0065-cv).  For a discussion of Dietzsch and Dugas, see supra notes 145−58 and 
accompanying text. 
 284. Supplemental Letter Brief for Appellee, supra note 283, at 4.  For a discussion of 
Peacock, see supra notes 172−80 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the Eighth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Goss, see supra Part II.A.2. 
 285. See Supplemental Letter Brief for Appellee, supra note 283, at 4 n.3. 
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Second, KBC pointed to cases where courts granted injunctions to 
prevent parties from litigating claims following the dismissal of an 
action.286  While res judicata and collateral estoppel should ordinarily 
suffice to protect the court’s final resolution, KBC argued that in some 
circumstances it may be necessary to enjoin vexatious relitigation such as 
the litigation in Karaha Bodas.287
Third, KBC contended that the New York Convention provides an 
independent source of jurisdiction for anti-foreign-suit injunctions in the 
arbitration context.
 
288  The appellee cited a district court decision holding 
that federal courts have jurisdiction over equitable actions related to 
arbitration under the New York Convention.289  Accordingly, even in the 
absence of ancillary jurisdiction, the district court had original subject 
matter jurisdiction to protect the foreign arbitral award.290
Fourth, KBC claimed that the district court retained jurisdiction because 
it continued to adjudicate a dispute over attorney’s fees and never entered a 
formal satisfaction of judgment.
 
291  Finally, KBC argued that Goss’s facts, 
involving a hyper-political trade dispute in which comity interests were 
more acute, rendered the Eighth Circuit’s decision inapplicable to the case 
on appeal.292
b.  Arguments Against Ancillary Jurisdiction 
 
The appellant, Pertamina, argued that the Second Circuit should follow 
the ruling in Goss and responded to each of KBC’s arguments in favor of 
ancillary jurisdiction.  First, Pertamina pointed to Kokkonen and Peacock as 
clear precedential support for a limited conception of post-satisfaction 
ancillary jurisdiction.293  According to Pertamina, those cases authorized 
ancillary jurisdiction only when “truly necessary to protect the court’s 
authority to manage the proceedings properly before it.”294
 
 286. Id. at 5 (citing Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 
1523−24 (9th Cir. 1983) and Covanta Onondaga Ltd. v. Onondaga Cnty. Res. Recovery 
Agency, 318 F.3d 393, 398 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
  Because the 
district court’s judgment in Karaha Bodas did not contain any ongoing 
injunctive relief, the judgment was fully satisfied with the payment of the 
 287. See id. 
 288. See id. at 6.  See supra notes 97−100 for a discussion of the New York Convention. 
 289. See Supplemental Letter Brief for Appellee, supra note 283, at 6 (citing Venconsul 
N.V. v. TIM Int’l N.V., No. 03 Civ. 5387, 2003 WL 21804833, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 
2003)). 
 290. See Supplemental Letter Brief for Appellee, supra note 283, at 6. 
 291. See id. at 6−7. 
 292. See id. at 7−10. 
 293. See Supplemental Letter Brief for Appellant at 2, Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan 
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 500 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 07-0065-
cv); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379−80 (1994) 
(limiting ancillary jurisdiction to two instances:  “(1) to permit disposition by a single court 
of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent, and (2) to 
enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its 
authority, and effectuate its decrees” (citations omitted)); supra Part I.C.4.b. 
 294. Supplemental Letter Brief for Appellant, supra note 293, at 3. 
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money damages.295  Accordingly, Pertamina argued, there were no longer 
any proceedings for the court to manage and the court therefore had no 
ancillary jurisdiction to issue the anti-suit injunction.296  The appellant also 
sought to distinguish Dietzsch and Dugas by noting that in Dietzsch the 
court exercised jurisdiction to remedy non-compliance with a court order, 
and in Dugas the court modified prior injunctive relief included in the final 
judgment.297  In addition, Pertamina contended that even if Dietzsch and 
Dugas supported KBC’s argument, the more recent cases of Peacock and 
Kokkonen were controlling.298
Second, Pertamina argued that a court may only enjoin relitigation if that 
relitigation is vexatious to the court issuing the injunction.
 
299  After all, 
Kokkonen permitted ancillary jurisdiction only when necessary for a “court 
to function successfully” and “manage its proceedings.”300  Pertamina 
contended that its subsequent suit would have no effect on the injunction-
issuing court, especially since it had fully satisfied the court’s judgment.301
Third, Pertamina disputed KBC’s claim that the New York Convention 
granted the court original jurisdiction to issue the anti-suit injunction.
 
302  
Instead, Pertamina argued that the New York Convention gives federal 
courts jurisdiction to provide injunctive relief only to compel arbitration or 
aid in a pending arbitration, neither of which was the case in Karaha 
Bodas.303
Finally, Pertamina rejected KBC’s contention that the district court 
retained jurisdiction over any further disputes.  Pertamina pointed out that 
the court recognized the satisfaction of judgment, even if it did not enter a 
formal declaration.
 
304  In addition, Pertamina argued, the existence of 
subject matter jurisdiction over other matters, such as attorney’s fees, did 
not automatically give the court jurisdiction over all subsequent disputes.305
c.  The Court’s Ruling 
   
The Second Circuit only briefly considered Goss in its opinion, 
summarizing the Eighth Circuit’s holding before rejecting it.306
[w]hile “[t]he boundaries of ancillary jurisdiction are not easily defined 
and the cases addressing it are hardly a model of clarity” . . . federal 
courts have continuing jurisdiction, grounded in the concepts of res 
  The court 
held that 
 
 295. See id. 
 296. See id. 
 297. See id. at 4. 
 298. See id. at 4−5. 
 299. See id. at 5. 
 300. Id. (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 380 (1994)). 
 301. See id. at 5−6; see also Karaha Bodas Petition, supra note 162, at 21−22. 
 302. See Supplemental Letter Brief for Appellant, supra note 293, at 7. 
 303. See id. at 8. 
 304. See id. at 3 n.2. 
 305. See id. at 3, 6. 
 306. See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 
500 F.3d 111, 129 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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judicata and collateral estoppel, to enjoin a party properly before them 
from relitigating issues in a non-federal forum that were already decided 
in federal court.  This source of jurisdiction remains even after a judgment 
has been satisfied . . . .307
The Second Circuit supported this proposition by reference to the power of 
federal courts to prevent relitigation in state courts of claims and issues 
already decided in federal court.
 
308  The court was apparently not persuaded 
that there was a distinction between exercises of jurisdiction to enforce a 
judgment or protect a decree of dismissal and post-satisfaction exercises of 
jurisdiction.309  The Second Circuit also distinguished Peacock, claiming 
that the case was inapposite because it applied to a putative ancillary claim 
brought against a third party.310  Interestingly, the Second Circuit did not 
rely on KBC’s other arguments, including its references to Dietzsch and 
Dugas.311
3.  Karaha Bodas’s Treatment of International Comity 
 
The Second Circuit began its analysis of the propriety of the anti-foreign-
suit injunction by affirming the test it adopted two decades earlier in China 
Trade and Development Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong.312  As stated by the 
court, the China Trade test for anti-foreign-suit injunctions requires a 
threshold determination of whether “‘(A) the parties are the same in both 
matters, and (B) resolution of the case before the enjoining court is 
dispositive of the action to be enjoined.’”313  If this inquiry is satisfied, the 
court must then determine whether the parallel litigation would “‘(1) 
frustrat[e] . . . a policy in the enjoining forum; (2) . . . be vexatious; 
(3) . . . threat[en] . . . the issuing court’s in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction; 
(4) . . . prejudice other equitable considerations; or (5) . . . result in delay, 
inconvenience, expense, inconsistency, or a race to judgment.’”314  While a 
court must consider all of these factors, it should place greater significance 
on whether the parallel suit would frustrate an important policy or threaten 
the court’s jurisdiction.315
 
 307. Id. (citing Garcia v. Teitler, 443 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
  Finally, the Second Circuit held that a court 
must consider international comity, which allows courts to issue anti-
 308. See id. (citing Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147 (1988)). 
 309. Id. (citing cases and treatises recognizing the ability of courts to enjoin parties from 
relitigating in other courts). 
 310. See id. at 129 n.19 (“Peacock’s statement that federal courts’ power to engage in 
‘supplementary proceedings involving third parties to assist in the protection and 
enforcement of federal judgments’ does not ‘extend[ ] beyond attempts to execute, or to 
guarantee the eventual executability of, a federal judgment’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356−57 (1996)). 
 311. See id. at 129−30. 
 312. 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 313. Karaha Bodas, 500 F.3d at 119 (citing Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial Ltda 
v. GE Med. Sys. Info. Tech. Inc., 369 F.3d 645, 652 (2004)). 
 314. Id. at 119 (quoting Ibeto Petrochemical Indus., Ltd v. M/T Beffen, 475 F.3d 56, 64 
(2d Cir. 2007)). 
 315. See id. 
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foreign-suit injunctions in only the rarest and most compelling 
circumstances.316
Applying the test, the court first found that the two-pronged threshold 
requirement was satisfied.
 
317  Next, the court applied its analysis to the 
other factors.  The court noted that the Cayman Islands action threatened 
the court’s jurisdiction because it clearly sought to reverse the judgment of 
the district court.318  The Second Circuit also found that the Cayman 
Islands action would be vexatious because it intended to further elongate a 
dispute over an arbitral award that had already been adjudicated in 
Switzerland, confirmed in Texas, and enforced in New York.319  For similar 
reasons, the court found that the parallel Cayman Islands proceeding would 
lead to delay and inconveniences and upset other equitable 
considerations.320
The Second Circuit expressed particular concern with the possibility that 
the Cayman Islands suit would undermine the international regime for the 
enforcement of arbitral awards under the New York Convention.
 
321  
According to the court, “the Cayman Islands ha[d] no arguable basis for 
jurisdiction . . . with respect to the Award” and “no power to modify or 
annul the Award under the [New York] Convention.”322  Consequently, the 
court found that, in certain circumstances it might be necessary to protect 
the Convention through the issuance of anti-foreign-suit injunctions.323
C.  Petitions for Certiorari 
  In 
sum, the Second Circuit held that the vexatious nature of the Cayman 
Islands suit, as well as comity considerations connected to the New York 
Convention, justified an anti-foreign-suit injunction. 
The losing parties in Goss and Karaha Bodas each filed petitions for 
certiorari to the Supreme Court.324  In both cases, the petitioners claimed 
that the two circuits were in direct conflict on ancillary jurisdiction and 
comity, while the respondents downplayed the conflict and focused on the 
unique facts of each case.325
 
 316. See id. 
  In Goss, the United States submitted an 
 317. See id. at 120−25. 
 318. See id. 
 319. See id. 
 320. See id. 
 321. See id. at 125; supra notes 97−100 and accompanying text. 
 322. Karaha Bodas, 500 F.3d at 125. 
 323. See id. at 125.  The Second Circuit acknowledged the Fifth Circuit’s holding, see id. 
at 124−25, that courts of secondary jurisdiction (i.e., courts of states other than the state from 
which the arbitral award issued) should exercise restraint in issuing anti-foreign-suit 
injunctions, see Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi 
Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 373 (5th Cir. 2003).  The Second Circuit, however, argued that 
“federal courts are not obligated to sit by idly when a party engages in proceedings that 
undermine the regime governing enforcement of foreign arbitral awards established by the 
Convention.” Karaha Bodas, 500 F.3d at 125 n.17. 
 324. Goss Petition, supra note 145, at 1; Karaha Bodas Petition, supra note 162, at 1. 
 325. Compare Goss Petition, supra note 145, at 13 (“The Court should grant the petition 
to resolve conflict among the circuits regarding two important and recurring questions of 
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amicus brief criticizing the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning but nonetheless 
opposing certiorari.326  The states of Oregon and New Hampshire, as well 
as a group of law professors also submitted amicus briefs in favor of 
certiorari.327
In Karaha Bodas, the United States filed a brief opposing certiorari and 
defending the Second Circuit’s decision on ancillary jurisdiction and 
comity.
 
328  The Republic of Indonesia filed an amicus brief in favor of 
certiorari.329  Indonesia’s brief included strongly worded language 
condemning the Second Circuit’s ruling as a violation of international 
comity and even a breach of the New York Convention.330  Indonesia also 
contended that the anti-suit injunction infringed upon the Cayman Islands’ 
sovereignty by preventing Caymanian courts from applying their own law 
to a controversy properly before them, and infringed upon Indonesian 
sovereignty since Pertamina was a state-owned Indonesian company.331
While some observers noted that these cases would have provided the 
Supreme Court with an opportunity to resolve the ongoing circuit split on 
the role of comity in anti-foreign-suit injunctions,
  
332 and others expressed 
concern that Goss’s ruling could encourage other foreign states to adopt 
clawback statutes,333 the Supreme Court denied both petitions on June 23, 
2008.334
 
federal jurisdiction and international comity . . . .”), and Karaha Bodas Petition, supra note 
 
162, at 14 (“The Second Circuit’s decision . . . squarely conflicts with the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision in Goss . . . .”), with Brief in Opposition at 9,  Goss Int’l. Corp. v. Tokyo Kikai 
Seisakusho, 554 U.S. 917 (2008) (No. 07-618), 2008 WL 140494, at *9 (“[T]he Eighth and 
Second Circuits . . . simply reached different conclusions as they applied similar standards to 
vastly different facts.”), and Karaha Bodas Opposition, supra note 145, at 3 (“[N]one of the 
. . . circuit splits [petitioner] alleges is ripe for review by this Court on the facts of this 
case.”). 
 326. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Certiorari at 16, Goss, 554 
U.S. 917 (No. 07-618), 2008 WL 2185728, at *16 (arguing that the Eighth Circuit’s 
“analysis was flawed in several respects” yet the “nature of the dispute counsels against 
further review”). 
 327. See Brief for the States of Oregon and New Hampshire as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Goss, 554 U.S. 917 (No. 07-618), 2007 WL 4377583; Brief 
for Law Professors, supra note 135. 
 328. Brief for United States in Karaha Bodas, supra note 145. 
 329. Brief of the Republic of Indonesia as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, PT 
Pertamina v. Karaha Bodas Co., 554 U.S. 929 (2008) (No. 07-619), 2007 WL 4350777. 
 330. See id. at 2 (“Unless vacated, the Second Circuit’s decision implicates the United 
States in a breach of its obligations owed to the Republic [of Indonesia] under the [New 
York] Convention and international law generally.”). 
 331. See id. at 4. 
 332. See Kotuby, supra note 24. 
 333. See Nelson, supra note 24, at 5 (“The Eighth Circuit’s decision allowing a litigant to 
completely claw back a final U.S. judgment . . . could encourage similar clawback 
legislation abroad with respect to a wide range of U.S. laws found objectionable in other 
countries.”). 
 334. See Goss Int’l. Corp. v. Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, 554 U.S. 917 (2008); Karaha 
Bodas, 554 U.S. 929. 
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D.  Aftermath 
1.  Goss:  Government Intervention and Settlement 
While certiorari was pending in Goss, TKS proceeded with its litigation 
in the Japanese courts under the Special Measures law.335  In response, 
members of the U.S. government began to pressure Japan and TKS to 
terminate the proceedings.336  By October 2008, State Department officials 
were engaged in talks with Japanese officials in Tokyo and Washington, 
D.C., and various senators voiced their opposition to the actions of TKS and 
Japan.337
In March 2009, Senators Judd Gregg and Jeanne Shaheen of New 
Hampshire, where Goss had substantial operations and many employees, 
introduced two pieces of legislation.
 
338  The first bill would have nullified 
any retaliatory action taken by Japanese courts.339  The second bill would 
have subjected TKS to a special duty to be collected by the U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection.340
It is critical for Goss International, its workers in New Hampshire, and for 
anyone who believes in fair trade, that foreign companies which have 
broken our trade laws be brought to justice.  TKS has committed fraud 
against the government, has been found guilty in our courts, and has been 
ordered to pay over $30 million in damages.  TKS should not be allowed 
to escape punishment, and the Japanese government should not be 
allowed to nullify this penalty through retaliatory acts that are solely 
intended to subvert our rule of law.
  Senator Gregg stated: 
341
Legislation proved unnecessary, however, since on September 2, 2009 
Goss and TKS reached a settlement.
 
342  TKS dismissed its action in 
Japan343 and Goss agreed not to pursue judicial or legislative action in the 
United States.344  After more than a decade of litigation, the dispute finally 
came to an end.345
 
 335. See Denis Paiste, U.S. Urges Japan on Goss Dispute, N.H. UNION LEADER, Oct. 23, 
2008, at B6. 
 
 336. See id. 
 337. See id. 
 338. Press Release, Senator Jeanne Shaheen, Gregg and Shaheen Introduce Two Bills to 
Support Goss International in Trade Dispute (Mar. 12, 2009), http://shaheen.senate.gov/
news/press/release/?id=5cdb5dfd-e4c9-4cec-ad40-e71ee240c46c. 
 339. See id. 
 340. See id. 
 341. Id. 
 342. See Goss, Japanese Firm Settle Years-Long Legal Battle, N.H. BUS. REV., Sept. 11, 
2009, at 18. 
 343. See id. 
 344. See Robert M. Cook, Goss, Japanese Firm Settles Multimillion Dollar Law Suit, 
FOSTER’S DAILY DEMOCRAT (Sept. 3, 2009), http://fosters.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/
20090903/GJBUSINESS_01/709039659. 
 345. See Goss, Japanese Firm Settle Years-Long Legal Battle, supra note 342. 
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2.  Karaha Bodas:  An Effective Injunction 
While awaiting the Supreme Court’s decision on certiorari, Pertamina 
complied with the Second Circuit’s decision and voluntarily dismissed its 
Cayman Islands suit on October 11, 2007, a month after the Karaha Bodas 
decision.346  Subsequently, Pertamina apparently decided to cut its losses 
and accepted the unfavorable arbitral award.  In 2009, Pertamina announced 
that it would be continuing the geothermal project at Karaha Bodas—
without KBC, of course.347
III.  HEEDING DAEDALUS’S WARNING:  COURTS SHOULD REFRAIN FROM 
ISSUING POST-SATISFACTION ANTI-FOREIGN-SUIT INJUNCTIONS 
 
This part contends that just as Daedalus warned his son Icarus not to fly 
too close to the sun, federal courts should ordinarily observe the limits of 
subject matter jurisdiction and international comity, and refrain from 
granting post-satisfaction anti-foreign-suit injunctions.  Part III first 
contends that the restrictive rule for post-satisfaction ancillary jurisdiction is 
correct and accordingly, neither the Goss nor Karaha Bodas courts 
possessed ancillary jurisdiction to issue an anti-foreign-suit injunction.  
This part next argues that even if there was jurisdiction, a post-satisfaction 
anti-foreign-suit injunction in Goss would have been improper as a matter 
of comity because the satisfaction of judgment fundamentally shifts the 
balance of interests between the U.S. court and the foreign forum.  
Nonetheless, the arbitration context presented in Karaha Bodas may present 
an exception to the general rule against post-satisfaction anti-foreign-suit 
injunctions.  Finally, Part III suggests that the executive and legislative 
branches can and should play a greater role in adopting diplomatic solutions 
to multi-forum litigation affecting the sovereignty of foreign states. 
A.  Federal Courts Generally Lack Ancillary Jurisdiction to Issue 
Post-satisfaction Anti-suit Injunctions 
On the question of post-satisfaction ancillary jurisdiction, the permissive 
rule enjoys the support of the Second Circuit, the United States government, 
and the states of Oregon and New Hampshire; the Eighth Circuit stands 
alone in its support of the restrictive rule.348
The restrictive rule best interprets the holdings of the Supreme Court 
while recognizing the limited scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction.  
  Nonetheless, the restrictive 
rule, which prevents courts from exercising post-satisfaction jurisdiction 
except when necessary to enforce the strict terms of a final order or when 
the court has expressly retained jurisdiction, is the correct standard. 
 
 346. PT Pertmamina (Persero) v. Karaha Bodas Co. (Cayman Islands Grand Ct., Oct. 11, 
2007), available at http://www.caymanjudicial-legalinfo.ky/judgments/Cayman-Islands-
Law-Reports/Cases/CILR2008/CILR08N001.aspx. 
 347. Government to Resume Karaha Bodas Power Project, JAKARTA POST (Apr. 3, 2009), 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/04/03/govt-resume-karaha-bodas-power-
project.html. 
 348. See supra notes 326−27 and accompanying text. 
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In Kokkonen, the Supreme Court held that courts must narrowly interpret 
the scope of ancillary jurisdiction.349  In that case, the district court 
dismissed claims with prejudice when the parties had reached a 
settlement.350  Because the terms of the settlement were not included in the 
dismissal order and the court did not retain jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider a 
claim arising out of an alleged breach of the settlement agreement.351  
Although it is obvious that the breach of a settlement is to some extent 
related to the initial action, the Court construed the first action very 
narrowly and relied on the limited nature of the final order.352  Similarly, in 
Peacock, the Court held that a claim to collect from a corporate officer was 
not sufficiently related to the initial claim producing a judgment against the 
corporation.353
The Supreme Court’s very strict and narrow analysis of the nexus 
between subsequent claims and the initial action makes sense in light of the 
codification of the two purposes of ancillary jurisdiction.  Federal courts 
may exercise jurisdiction over related claims and parties under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367, while various Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give courts power to 
effectuate and modify their judgments.
 
354  Kokkonen and Peacock show 
reluctance on the part of the Supreme Court to extend ancillary jurisdiction 
beyond those situations that statutes or rules already authorize.355  Instead, 
a federal court may only exercise ancillary jurisdiction when the court 
expressly retains jurisdiction over subsequent disputes or when the 
subsequent claim is strictly necessary for the court to enforce the terms of 
its final order.356
Applying the restrictive rule to Goss and Karaha Bodas, neither of the 
district courts had ancillary jurisdiction to grant a post-satisfaction anti-suit 
injunction.  While the motions for anti-suit injunctions were to some degree 
related to the initial action, the defendants had fully complied with the relief 
granted in the court’s order by paying the plaintiff a sum of money.
 
357  
Consequently, the subsequent motions for anti-suit injunctions were no 
more closely related to the initial actions than the breach-of-settlement 
claim in Kokkonen.358
While the proponents of the permissive rule rely on other Supreme Court 
precedents, these cases are distinguishable.  Pacific Railroad is inapposite 
because in that case the parties sought subsequent relief based on an 
allegation that the initial judgment was induced by fraud.
 
359
 
 349. See supra Part I.C.4.b. 
  Rule 60 of the 
 350. See supra notes 163−65 and accompanying text. 
 351. See supra notes 165−67, 169−71 and accompanying text. 
 352. See supra notes 169−71 and accompanying text. 
 353. See supra notes 172−80 and accompanying text. 
 354. See supra notes 131−33, 136–37, 179−80 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra notes 179−80 and accompanying text. 
 356. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 357. See supra notes 235, 276 and accompanying text. 
 358. See supra notes 164−71 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, expressly authorizes such an 
action.360
Dietzsch is also distinguishable because it involved an anti-suit injunction 
against a party that was in strict non-compliance with a federal court 
order.
  Consequently, Pacific Railroad only supports a codified and 
uncontroversial variety of post-satisfaction jurisdiction. 
361  By trying to collect on the replevin bond in state court, the losing 
party in Dietzsch directly imperiled and flouted the federal court’s 
adjudication of the disputed property.362
Finally, Dugas does not support the permissive rule because in that case 
the court expressly retained jurisdiction over subsequent disputes in its final 
order and had explicit statutory authorization for its exercise of post-
satisfaction subject matter jurisdiction.
 
363  Since the restrictive rule allows 
for post-satisfaction ancillary jurisdiction under such circumstances,364
The restrictive rule is also sound as a matter of policy because it supports 
the constitutional design establishing federal courts as courts of limited 
subject matter jurisdiction.
 
Dugas is entirely consistent with the narrower approach. 
365  The Constitution sought to reserve plenary 
judicial power to state courts.366  Accordingly, parties are not left without a 
remedy if they are blocked from federal court since they may be able to 
bring their claims in state court.  In addition, if a federal court wants to 
permanently prevent a party from pursuing litigation in other countries, it 
can include a permanent injunction as part of its final order or retain 
jurisdiction over any subsequent disputes between parties.367
It is important to reiterate that the absence of ancillary jurisdiction does 
not preclude federal courts from issuing anti-foreign-suit injunctions when 
they have original jurisdiction.  For example, the appellees in Karaha 
Bodas contended that the New York Convention gave federal courts 
original jurisdiction to issue a wide range of equitable relief related to 
arbitral awards.
  Finally, if 
Congress determines that the restrictive rule unnecessarily restricts federal 
courts’ ancillary jurisdiction, it can pass a statute or approve a new Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure adopting the permissive rule. 
368
 
 360. See supra note 
  While the merits of this argument are beyond the scope 
of this Note, such a statutory grant of original jurisdiction would obviate the 
need for ancillary jurisdiction. 
144. 
 361. See supra notes 145−51, 297 and accompanying text. 
 362. See supra notes 149−51 and accompanying text (discussing Dietzsch); see also 
supra note 170 and accompanying text (describing Kokkonen’s focus on whether the party to 
be enjoined flouted or imperiled the final disposition of the case). 
 363. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 364. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 365. See supra notes 119−20 and accompanying text. 
 366. See supra note 120. 
 367. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 368. See supra notes 288−90 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Post-satisfaction Anti-foreign-suit Injunctions Are Ordinarily 
Inconsistent with International Comity 
1.  Comity Is Especially Important when a Foreign Forum Would Not 
Apply Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel to a U.S. Judgment 
While the Eighth Circuit reached the correct conclusion on comity, it 
sidestepped the main inquiry.369  The court claimed that it should give 
special weight to comity because the Japanese lawsuit under the clawback 
statute was technically litigation over a new and different issue.370  This 
analysis is unconvincing, however.  While the Japanese action was 
technically litigation under a different statute, the purpose of the Japanese 
lawsuit was to litigate the same issue as the action in Iowa, namely, whether 
TKS should be liable for a violation of the Anti-Dumping Act.371
It is possible, however, to cast this argument differently.  The Eighth 
Circuit may have been suggesting that it would not be proper for it to 
determine the proper res judicata value that the Japanese court should give a 
U.S. judgment.  Once TKS paid the judgment in the U.S., any further 
injunction would have prevented Japan from applying its own laws and 
making its own determination on res judicata and collateral estoppel.
 
372  
Comity would be superfluous if it only applied when a foreign country 
would apply the same legal standards as U.S. courts.  As a doctrine 
designed in part to protect the dignity and interests of other sovereigns,373
2.  The Satisfaction of Judgment Shifts the Balance of Domestic 
and Foreign Interests 
 
comity seems to be especially implicated when foreign sovereigns have 
intentionally adopted policies contrary to those of the United States. 
While U.S. courts must take into account the policy objectives of foreign 
sovereigns, federal courts also have an obligation to advance the policies of 
the United States and to adjudicate the disputes before them.374  For this 
reason, courts have held that comity becomes less relevant once a court 
reaches judgment and, under such circumstances, U.S. courts should be 
more willing to enforce judgments by issuing anti-foreign-suit 
injunctions.375
 
 369. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 
 370. See supra notes 252−53 and accompanying text. 
 371. See supra notes 226−27 and accompanying text (noting that Japan passed the statute 
under the belief that Congress’s merely prospective repeal of the Anti-Dumping Act 
breached the United States’ WTO obligations). 
 372. See supra notes 252−53 and accompanying text; see also Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man 
Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491 F.3d 355, 366 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Our 
consideration of international comity must allow the Japanese courts, in the first instance, to 
determine the enforceability of the Special Measures Law, which will undoubtedly involve 
application of Japanese precedent and domestic policy, and the Japanese courts’ own 
consideration of international comity.”). 
 373. See supra notes 183−88 and accompanying text. 
 374. See supra note 65. 
 375. See supra notes 69−70 and accompanying text. 
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However, once a party satisfies judgment the comity analysis should 
shift.  In such situations, the losing party has fully complied with the federal 
court’s order, the winning party has been made whole, and the court has 
successfully vindicated and enforced United States law.  The U.S. court’s 
only interest in the dispute is to protect the permanence of the judgment.  
While this is a valid interest, it cannot and should not overcome the 
interests of a foreign court that wants the opportunity to apply its own laws 
to the dispute and advance its own policies.  As the Supreme Court noted in 
Pimentel, “There is a comity interest in allowing a foreign state to use its 
own courts for a dispute if it has a right to do so.  The dignity of a foreign 
state is not enhanced if other nations bypass its courts without right or good 
cause.”376
In Goss, Japan had a strong interest in protecting its nationals from a 
judgment that it believed to be in violation of WTO obligations.
 
377  In 
Karaha Bodas, the Cayman Islands had an interest in resolving a dispute 
involving KBC, a limited liability company organized under its laws.378  In 
addition, both the Eighth and the Second Circuits follow the conservative 
approach to anti-foreign-suit injunctions, under which anti-foreign-suit 
injunctions are only permitted when domestic interests outweigh the comity 
interests of the foreign forum.379
3.  An Anti-foreign-suit Injunction May Have Been Justified in Karaha 
Bodas 
  Once judgment is satisfied, the balance of 
interests shifts decidedly in favor of the foreign forum. 
Although an examination of international comity should ordinarily 
prevent courts from issuing post-satisfaction anti-foreign-suit injunctions, 
Karaha Bodas may be an exception to the rule.  In that case, Pertamina 
sought to nullify the arbitral award through unceasing litigation in several 
different countries.380  Pertamina’s highly vexatious behavior and its 
consistent record of failure gave the Second Circuit good reason for 
concern.  While an injunction may have been inappropriate if Pertamina had 
brought an action in Indonesia—given that country’s strong interest in 
adjudicating a dispute involving a state-run company—the Cayman Islands 
was entitled to considerably less deference.381
 
 376. Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 866 (2008); see also supra 
note 
  The Cayman Islands’ 
interest was limited to a generic interest in applying its laws to disputes 
involving its citizens.  While such a broad, generalized interest may often 
be enough to preclude an anti-foreign-suit injunction, it should not 
outweigh countervailing comity concerns in Karaha Bodas where KBC 
187 and accompanying text. 
 377. See supra notes 226−27 and accompanying text. 
 378. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
 379. See supra notes 195−203 and accompanying text. 
 380. See supra note 272 and accompanying text. 
 381. See supra notes 321−23 and accompanying text. 
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sought to confirm and enforce a foreign arbitral award under the New York 
Convention.382
The New York Convention is a mechanism designed to further comity by 
establishing a regime for the confirmation of foreign arbitral awards.
 
383  
Under the New York Convention, only the courts of the state where the 
arbitration took place may nullify the award.384  Thus, in protecting the 
fruits of the arbitral award, the Second Circuit was not only advancing the 
policies of an international regime grounded in comity, but was also 
protecting the interests of the courts of Switzerland (the country of 
arbitration), which had previously refused to nullify the award. 385
C.  The Executive and Legislative Branches Are Better Equipped to Manage 
Disputes Implicating the Sovereignty of Foreign States 
  These 
countervailing comity concerns unique to Karaha Bodas, may have been 
strong enough to outweigh the Cayman Islands’s limited interest in the 
litigation. 
A court will not necessarily deprive a victorious plaintiff of its judgment 
if it refuses to grant an anti-foreign-suit injunction against a losing party 
who seeks to continue litigation in a foreign forum.  The aftermath of Goss 
demonstrates just the opposite.  There, several senators as well as various 
executive branch departments intervened and urged Japan to reconsider its 
application of the clawback statute.386  In the face of this pressure from the 
U.S. government, as well as the threat of punitive retaliatory legislation, 
TKS withdrew the Japanese suit and settled with Goss.387
By vacating the anti-foreign-suit injunction, the Eighth Circuit allowed 
the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government to use their 
superior expertise in foreign affairs as well as their wider range of policy-
making tools to reach a resolution.  Had the Eighth Circuit upheld the 
injunction, it is unlikely the dispute would have ceased.  Given the 
circumstances, it is possible that Japan may have pursued further retaliatory 
measures.  But since the Eighth Circuit removed itself from the political 
fray, the other branches of government were able to resolve a complex and 
difficult situation. 
 
Of course, the aftermath of Goss may not be typical.  After all, Goss had 
important allies in the United States government.388
 
 382. See supra note 323 and accompanying text. 
  If the Second Circuit 
had vacated the anti-suit injunction against Pertamina’s suit in the Cayman 
Islands, KBC may not have had the same support from the government.  
Nevertheless, it makes more sense both constitutionally and as a matter of 
policy for courts to defer to the executive and legislative branches when it 
 383. See supra notes 97−100, 321−23 and accompanying text. 
 384. See supra text accompanying notes 269−70. 
 385. See supra text accompanying notes 269−70. 
 386. See supra notes 336−41 and accompanying text. 
 387. See supra notes 343−45 and accompanying text. 
 388. See supra notes 336−41. 
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comes to making decisions that will deprive a foreign court of 
jurisdiction.389
CONCLUSION 
 
For federal courts engaged in the often Sisyphean task of managing 
multi-forum international commercial litigation, anti-foreign-suit 
injunctions are a powerful measure that can bring finality to a case by 
effectively stripping foreign courts of jurisdiction over a dispute.  Courts 
must be careful, however, not to trade the fate of Sisyphus for that of Icarus.  
Like Icarus, who perished when he flew too close to the sun, federal courts 
exceed the limits of subject matter jurisdiction and international comity 
when they grant post-satisfaction anti-foreign-suit injunctions.  As this Note 
has argued, a federal court generally lacks ancillary subject matter 
jurisdiction to issue anti-suit injunctions once judgment has been satisfied.  
Moreover, considerations of international comity will ordinarily militate 
against the issuance of anti-foreign-suit injunctions after the satisfaction of 
judgment.  Finally, the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. 
government should take a larger role in addressing complicated and 
seemingly endless litigation that creates tension between the United States 
and foreign governments. 
 
 
 
 389. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
